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This paper applies the insights of the carbon leakage literature to study the emissions consequences of
biofuel policies. We develop a simple analytic framework to decompose the intended emissions impacts of
biofuel policy from four sources of carbon leakage: domestic fuel markets, domestic land markets, world
land markets and world crude oil markets. A numerical simulation model illustrates the magnitude of
each source of leakage for combinations of two current US biofuel policies: the Volumetric Ethanol Excise
Tax Credit (VEETC) and the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS). In the presence of both land and fuel
market leakage, current US biofuel policies are unlikely to reduce greenhouse gases. Four of the ve
policy scenarios we consider lead to increases in greenhouse gas emissions. That is, total leakage was
greater than 100%. The single scenario that generates emissions savings, the removal of the VEETC in
conjunction with a binding RFS, only does so because negative leakage in the domestic fuel market oset
the remaining positive sources of leakage.
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1 Introduction
Global climate change has enormous implications for many nations, with costs of mitigation alone expected
to comprise 0.3 to 0.7% of global GDP by 2100 (World Bank [1]). 1 In the absence of eective global policy-
making, many countries have initiated unilateral initiatives to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.
Given that the combustion of fossil fuels for transportation is a major source of greenhouse gas emissions|
with passenger vehicles accounting for 22% of fossil fuel related emissions in the US alone|many countries,
including the US, have implemented policies that attempt to expand the use of liquid biofuels, a substitute
for fossil fuel based transportation fuels (US EPA [2]). Given that biofuel feedstocks absorb CO2 during
growth, biofuels are believed to provide emissions savings relative to fossil fuels (US EPA [3]). Policies that
attempt to expand biofuels in order to exploit these potential emissions savings are expected to generate
a meaningful reduction in total GHG emissions. However, the extent to which these policies will lead to
emissions reductions ultimately depends upon complicated interactions that are typically not considered in
the policy-makers original decision making process. With regard to greenhouse gas emissions, the emissions
consequences of such interactions have been labelled \carbon leakage."
Carbon leakage occurs when regulations aecting GHG emissions directly increase (or decrease in the case
of negative leakage) emissions from unregulated rms, sectors or countries. In the presence of positive leakage,
realized reductions in global emissions are smaller than the intended, or anticipated, emissions reductions.
Early studies on carbon leakage related to energy markets measured increased GHG emissions in unregulated
countries in response to unilateral or sub-global (e.g. the Kyoto Protocol) climate programs. Emissions
were shown to increase in unregulated countries as a result of both producer relocation from regulated to
unregulated regions (Babiker [4]) as well as from an increase in energy consumption in unregulated regions
1These estimates reect the range across six peer-reviewed assessment models (DICE, FAIR, MESSAGE, MiniCAM, PAGE,
and REMIND), and assume stabilization at 450 ppm CO2e, which would provide a 40 to 50% chance of staying below 2 degrees
warming by 2100 (World Bank [1]).
1due to depressed world energy prices (Felder and Rutherford [5]). Recent work has demonstrated leakage due
to incomplete regulation of a single sector (Fowlie [6]) and overlapping state and federal policies (Goulder
et al. [7]). Another group of studies have shown that leakage may occur in land markets when policies, such
as conservation or set-aside programs alter the relative returns to land faced by private landowners (Stavins
and Jae [8], Murray et al. [9]).2 Biofuel policies may alter both the prices of blended fuel and agricultural
crops, and thus are subject to leakage in both energy and land markets. Prior analyses of the emissions from
biofuel policies have failed to measure both sources of leakage in a comprehensive and coherent way.
The GHG emissions impacts of biofuels have mainly been studied using lifecycle analysis methods, which
largely ignore economic adjustments (Farrell et al. [10]; Hill et al. [11]). Lifecycle analysis attempts to
measure the total emissions attributable to a single unit of a biofuel, including emissions from inputs used
in production, transportation, and nal end use of the biofuel. If the lifecycle emissions of a unit of biofuel
are less than the lifecycle emissions of an energy equivalent unit of the fossil alternative (gasoline or diesel),
then that biofuel is said to achieve emissions savings. In the case of corn based ethanol, studies using these
attributional lifecycle analysis methods have found GHG emissions savings on the order of 20% to 30%
relative to gasoline (Farrell et al. [10]; Wang [12]). Using lifecycle emissions metrics, the US EPA's rst
regulatory impact analysis of the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS), a series of gradually expanding biofuels
mandates, estimated that the expanded use of 7.56 billion liters of corn ethanol in the US would reduce
greenhouse gas emissions by 11 tgCO2e (US EPA [13]).
More recent analyses have shown that the emissions generated by the clearing of undisturbed lands
resulting from expanded corn ethanol production could be large enough to undermine any lifecycle emissions
savings (Fargione et al. [14])3 In light of these and other studies, the EPA updated the RFS to classify biofuels
according to the lifecycle emissions thresholds that are inclusive of emissions attributable to land use change
(US EPA [3]). The intention of these lifecycle emissions thresholds is to ensure that the RFS in fact reduces
greenhouse gas emissions. The second regulatory impact analysis of the RFS conducted by the US EPA [16]|
by far the most comprehensive emissions assessment of biofuels to date, incorporating agricultural models
to assess domestic and international leakage from land use change and shifts in agricultural production|
determined that corn ethanol just meets the 20% lifecycle emissions savings threshold put forth by legislators
in establishing the RFS.
All prior assessments of the greenhouse gas impacts of biofuel policy have at least three key shortcomings.
First, prior studies have not directly assessed the impact of specic US biofuel policy instruments on GHG
2Stavins and Jae [8] analyze the impacts of land conservation programs on wetland depletion rather than greenhouse gas
emissions. However, the concept of leakage can be applied to both settings.
3Searchinger et al. [15] using an agricultural model to study the carbon leakage in land markets due to US biofuel policy,
obtain a similar conclusion.
2emissions. Instead, prior studies have relied either on lifecycle emissions savings metrics that do not account
for potential economic adjustments, or have considered the impacts of an expansion in US biofuel consump-
tion on emissions from land use with no reference to the policy driving the expansion (Searchinger et al. [15];
US EPA [16]).4 Second, prior studies mostly ignore the emissions impact of expanded biofuel consumption
on fuel markets.5 This omission is especially problematic given that most biofuel policies directly impact
fuel markets. Third, prior studies have not addressed how emission impacts vary with dierent magnitudes
of biofuel expansion.
This paper attempts to address these shortcomings. First, we propose a very simple analytical model and
derive a marginal emissions formula that decomposes the emissions consequences of a generic biofuel policy
into intended emissions reductions and carbon leakage. Carbon leakage is further decomposed into domestic
and international land and fuel market eects. Secondly, we provide empirical estimates of leakage resulting
from a pair of US biofuel policies, the Volumetric Ethanol Excise Tax Credit (VEETC) and the Renewable
Fuel Standard for corn ethanol, using a numerical general equilibrium model that is fully integrated with
a comprehensive emissions accounting. This allows us to illustrate which economic adjustments drive the
various components of carbon leakage resulting from biofuel policies from the perspective of the US regulator.
Our modeling framework integrates domestic agricultural and fuel markets and considers trade in agri-
cultural crops and crude oil. To account for land market leakage, we model the agricultural land allocation
decision, which allows for cropland expansion, and the demand for agricultural crops by domestic food and
biofuel producers, as well as from abroad. From this framework, we are able to measure land market leakages
from extensive (cropland expansion) and intensive (shifts to more emissions intensive crops) adjustments in
domestic agriculture, and from international land use change. To capture energy market leakage we model
the fuel blender's decision, which depends on he relative prices of gasoline and biofuel, while allowing for
the prices of crude oil and agricultural crops to be determined endogenously. These features allow us to
determine the impact of a policy on the domestic blended fuel price and the world price of crude oil. We
will subsequently be able to assess the leakage in both of these markets.
Using our numerical model we simulate the emissions impacts of two US corn ethanol policies: the
Volumetric Ethanol Excise Tax Credit (VEETC) and the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) for corn ethanol.
The VEETC is a subsidy paid to the fuel blender for each unit of ethanol used to produce blended fuel.
4These studies analyze any expansion of biofuels, ignoring whether this expansion is induced by public policy or by market
forces. However, most current discussions regarding appropriate reference baselines in global climate change negotiations are
generally reective of pre-existing and historical economic conditions.
5There are a handful of studies on the impact of biofuel policies on fuel markets (see for example deGorter and Just [17]),
however these studies do not directly consider GHG emissions. Two exceptions are Rajagopal et al. [18] and Drabik et al. [19].
However, these studies do not consider agricultural or land use emissions. Moreover, none of these studies estimate emissions
impacts across a theoretically consistent equilibrium model where prices of fuels and crops are jointly endogenously determined,
as is the case here.
3The RFS requires that fuel blenders include a minimum quantity of ethanol in each unit of blended fuel
produced. The federal government sets the ethanol blend requirement annually, such that total US ethanol
consumption is above a mandated level. Our results support prior studies that nd considerable land market
leakage from biofuel policies, however we nd that in the presence of the VEETC, leakage in fuel markets can
be of a similar magnitude. Further, while land market leakage tends to be stable across scenarios, leakage
in fuel markets is substantially more variable and can be actually be negative if the VEETC is removed.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops an analytical model that describes the
intended emissions eects and leakage from a marginal change in a generic biofuel policy. Section 3 outlines
the functional form assumptions of our numerical model and describes the data used for calibration. Section
4 presents results, and Section 5 concludes.
2 Analytical Model
We rst develop a simple analytical model that integrates the behavior of key agents aected by biofuel
policies with greenhouse gas emissions. Using this framework, we derive a marginal emissions formula which
decomposes the intended emissions impacts and carbon leakage that result from a generic biofuel policy.
Carbon leakage is further broken down into four sources: domestic land markets, domestic fuel markets,
world land markets and world crude oil markets.
2.1 Model Assumptions
We consider a model with two countries, D and W, with small open economies. We focus on country D, and
let W be a collection of countries representing the rest of the world. Both countries, indexed k, are endowed
with land (  Ak), labor ( Lk) and crude oil (  Rk). The countries trade agricultural crops and crude oil. All
other goods, including the land and labor endowments, are assumed to be immobile. Therefore, the prices
of crops and crude oil are determined on the world market, while all other prices are determined in domestic
markets. Country D implements a new biofuel policy, 
. The response of country W to 
 is determined
only by changes in world prices. To simplify notation, in what follows we drop the index k for all country
specic prices and goods.
We consider a representative consumer in each country, who enjoys utility from blended fuel (F), food
(X) and a numeraire consumption good (C).6 The household's utility function is represented by:
U(F;X;C) (2.1)
where U() is continuous and quasi-concave. The budget constraint of the representative household is given
6For succinctness, we abstract from the choice of vehicle miles traveled (Parry and Small [20]) here.
4by:
PFF + PXX + PLC    A + PR  R + PL L (2.2)
where PF is the domestic price of blended fuel, PX is the domestic price of food, PL is the domestic wage
rate7, and   A is the net returns to the country's land endowment.
The household chooses F, X, and C to maximize utility (2.1) subject to the budget constraint (2.2).
From the resulting rst-order conditions we obtain the Walrasian demand functions for blended fuel, food
and the numeraire good:
F(PF;PX;PL;  A;PR) X(PF;PX;PL;  A;PR) C(PF;PX;PL;  A;PR): (2.3)
Agricultural Production
Each country maximizes the net returns to its land endowment by allocating land to the production of a
food-fuel crop, Y , a food crop, Z, or to non-agricultural uses, N. The food-fuel crop can be used as a
feedstock for biofuel production, or to produce food, while the food crop represents all other crops. Non-
agricultural land is all land of a quality sucient for agricultural production but which currently sustains an
alternative land use.8 This framework allows the agricultural sector to adjust along both an intensive margin
(changes within cropland) as well as an extensive margin (cropland expansion). Allowing the subscript i to









Ai   A (2.4)
where PY and PZ are world crop prices, Ai is the quantity of land allocated to land use i and ci is the amount
of labor required per unit land to produce crop i. The functions yY (AY ) and yZ(AZ) are the yields (units
of crop per unit land) of the food-fuel and food crops, respectively. Setting PN = 1, the function yN(AN)
is the stream of monetary benets to the land owner from holding land in non-agricultural uses.9 To reect
decreasing returns to expanded agricultural production and decreasing marginal benets from holding land
7C is assumed to be produced by competitive rms with the production technology C = L, so that in competitive equilibrium
PC = PL.
8Alternative land uses could be forest, pasture, or land allocated to agricultural set aside programs.
9yN may include the private returns to non-cropland land uses arising from long-run management practices, the revenue
from the sale of products such as timber, and lower future costs of production from holding land fallow. Alternatively, yN could
reect government payments to the land-owner for keeping land in non-agricultural uses. In this case, the revenue needed to
nance such a program is funded from a head tax on the representative consumer.
5in non-agricultural uses, yi(Ai) are assumed to be monotonically decreasing and concave.
The rst order conditions of (2.4) provide the land supply functions:
AY (PY ;PZ;PL;  A) AZ(PY ;PZ;PL;  A) AN(PY ;PZ;PL;  A) (2.5)
which are used to generate the crop supply functions:
Y (PY ;PZ;PL;  A) = yY (AY ())AY () Z(PY ;PZ;PL;  A) = yZ (AZ())AZ(): (2.6)
Finally, we note that the value function of (2.4) is given by   A(PY ;PZ;PL;  A).
Fuel Production
Blended fuel is produced from gasoline (G) and biofuel (E) by a representative fuel blender whose constant
returns to scale production function is given by:
F = F(G;E): (2.7)
The fuel blender chooses E and G to minimize production costs, GPG + EPE, subject to Equation (2.7),
where PE and PG, are the domestic prices of biofuel and gasoline, respectively.10 Under constant returns, the
market price of blended fuel just equals the marginal cost of producing blended fuel, PF(PG;PE). Moreover,
market closure implies that the demand for gasoline and biofuel are determined by the Walrasian demand
for blended fuel, hence:
G = gF(PG;PE)F() E = eF(PG;PE)F() (2.8)
where gF() and eF() are the per-unit conditional factor demands for gasoline and biofuel, respectively.
Gasoline and biofuel are produced by competitive rms under constant returns to scale with production
technology denoted G and E respectively. Gasoline is produced from crude oil, R, while biofuel is produced
from the food-fuel crop. The gasoline and biofuel production technologies are given by:
G = G(R)
E = E(YE) (2.9)
where YE is the food-fuel crop used for biofuel production. The gasoline producer chooses R to minimize
10The assumptions that gasoline and biofuel are not traded is generally representative of the US. Between 2005 and 2009,
the US imported less than 3% of total nished gasoline consumed, and exported less than 5% of total gasoline produced (EIA).
Over this same time, less than 7% of total ethanol consumed was imported (Renewable Fuels Association).
6gasoline production costs subject to the gasoline production technology, taking the world price of crude oil
as given. Equivalently, the biofuel producer chooses YE to minimize biofuel production costs, subject to the
biofuel production function. The competitive domestic prices of gasoline and ethanol are the derivatives of
the corresponding total cost function with respect to output and can be written PG(PR) and PE(PY ).
The fuel blender's decision is modeled explicitly for two reasons. First, this specication allows fuel
to be treated as the nal consumption good rather than gasoline and biofuel. This matches current fuel
market characteristics in the US, because with only some minor exceptions, consumers are unable to choose
the quantity of biofuel in the fuel they purchase.11 Second, this permits us to handle a number of biofuel
policies, and to trace out the impacts of these policies on the price of blended fuel. For example, 
 could
consist of a subsidy for biofuel consumption or a quantity restriction on biofuel.
Food Production
Incorporating the food sector allows for an explicit trade-o between demand for agricultural products for
food production, and demand for agricultural products for biofuel production. Food is produced from food-
fuel crop and the food crop by competitive rms with constant returns to scale production technology:
X = X(YX;ZX) (2.10)
where YX is quantity of the food-fuel crop used in food production, and ZX is the quantity of the food crop
used for food production. The food producer chooses YX and ZX to minimize production costs PY YX+PZZX
subject to the food production technology, taking the world prices of crops as given. The solution to this
problem yields conditional factor demand equations that describe the quantities of the food-fuel crop and
the food crop allocated to food production
YX(PY ;PZ;X) ZX(PY ;PZ;X) (2.11)
and a total cost function for food production. Dierentiating the total cost function with respect to output
yields the competitive price of food PX(PY ;PZ), which given constant returns is independent of output.
Equilibrium
Normalizing the domestic wage rate in country D, PL;D = 1 , an equilibrium consists of a price vector,
[PY ;PZ;PR;PL;W], such that the world markets for agricultural crops (Y and Z) and crude oil, and the
11In the US, consumers can choose among various biofuel gasoline blends. However, the vast majority of blended fuel sold
contains 10% ethanol, called E10, because this fuel can be used in a standard gasoline vehicle (EIA). Higher percentage blends,
such as E85, require additional infrastructure to distribute, and a special exible-fuel vehicle to consume. These restrictions
have limited the market penetration of higher ethanol blends.
7labor markets in countries D and W clear.12
Emissions
Greenhouse gas emissions are modeled using constant marginal emissions factors that specify the amount of
greenhouse gas emissions, in units of carbon dioxide equivalent, per unit of a given product or activity. To
facilitate the exposition of the greenhouse gas emissions impacts below, we assume that country W does not
produce biofuel. Further, we abstract from the emissions from crop production in country W.13 Therefore,
variables below that are not indexed by country are for country D.
The total contribution to greenhouse gas emissions of a unit of gasoline, or the lifecycle emissions of
gasoline, are G = G;C + G;M. The emissions from gasoline consumption (combustion) are G;C, which
eectively maps the chemical characteristics of gasoline to greenhouse gas emissions (NETL [21]). The
production of gasoline generates emissions at a rate of G;M per unit output. This factor accounts for the
fossil fuels combusted during crude oil rening and crude oil recovery (NETL [21]).
Following the IPCC [22], we assume that the consumption (combustion) of biofuel has no impact on
atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations, E;C = 0. This reects that the carbon stored in biofuel,
and released during biofuel combustion, is absorbed from the atmosphere during the growth of the biofuel
feedstock. The manufacture of biofuel generates emissions at a rate of E;M per unit biofuel, due to fossil
fuels used in the production of the biofuel. This illustrates an important point. Holding all else equal,
increasing the quantity of biofuel in the economy will increase total emissions because the production of
biofuel generates emissions. It follows that biofuel policies can only achieve emissions savings to the extent
that the consumption of gasoline is displaced by the consumption of biofuel.
As we abstract from biofuel consumption in country W, we can calculate total fuel emissions in the rest
of the world based on the consumption of crude oil. We assume that the consumption of crude oil in country
W produces emissions at a rate of R per unit crude oil.
Each unit of land allocated to the production crop Y and Z produces Y and Z units of greenhouse gas
emissions respectively. These factors capture emissions from interactions between agricultural soils and farm
inputs (such as nitrogenous fertilizer and lime) and on-farm fossil fuel combustion, as well as emissions from
the production of farm inputs. In contrast, non-agricultural land uses provide emissions benets through
the uptake of atmospheric carbon by undisturbed land cover (such as the growth of forest or grasslands)
and through increased carbon sequestration in soils (Fargione et al. [14]). These benets are lost when non-
12By market clearing, it is the case that the total endowment of crude oil is consumed regardless of biofuel policy. This
illustrates an extreme example in which any reductions in US crude oil consumption are completely oset by increased world
consumption. This is a result of our inability to capture the dynamic components of the crude oil production decision, based
on expectations of future prices, in our static framework.
13As noted by the EPA [16], adjustments in world crop mix resulting from US biofuel policy could be a source of leakage.
However, the magnitude of this leakage is likely to be small in comparison to emissions from expansions in world cropland, and
these adjustments fall outside the scope of our numerical model.
8agricultural land is brought into agricultural production. We specify N;k to represent the annual emissions
benets of holding land in non-agricultural uses, so that a reduction in land allocated to non-agricultural
uses results in positive emissions. We emphasize that N;k diers across the two countries to reect that
the climate benets provided non-agricultural land uses are largely driven by regional characteristics (US
EPA [16], Fargione et al. [14], Searchinger et al. [15]).
Given our modeling framework, total emissions, , are given by:
 = GG + E;ME + Y AY + XAX + N;DAN;D + N;WAN;W + RRW: (2.12)
where all quantities and emissions factors are specic to country D unless otherwise indexed.
2.2 Marginal Emissions Eects
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: (2.13)
The rst term on the right-hand side of Equation (2.13) consists of the intended emissions eects of this
policy. The intended emissions savings of the policy are the expected emissions reductions of the policy
calculated using lifecycle analysis (LCA) techniques.15 This eect equals the per unit lifecycle emissions
savings of biofuel relative to gasoline multiplied by the change in biofuel consumption due to the policy.
Three main assumptions are implicit in the lifecycle emissions savings of biofuel (see for example Farrell et
al. [10] or US EPA [13]). First, the production of a unit of biofuel generates emissions of E;M. Second,
E;Y units of the food-fuel crop are need to produce each unit of biofuel, and an additional ~ AY =
E;Y
yY () units
of land are allocated to food-fuel crop production per unit of biofuel. Explicitly, ~ AY is the amount of land,
in units of area, required to produce one unit of biofuel. Finally, each energy unit of biofuel displaces one
energy unit of gasoline. A consequence of this last assumption is that the intended emissions impacts are
14See Appendix A.1 for derivation.
15Our construction of the intended emissions eects was necessary because biofuel policies do not target a level of emissions
reductions. Lifecycle methods were used because this is a technique commonly used by regulators. For example, the US EPA's
initial Regulatory Impact Analysis of the Renewable Fuel Standard assigned emissions savings to each energy unit of corn
ethanol according its lifecycle emissions savings relative to an energy equivalent unit of gasoline [13]. More recently, the EPA
has required each class of biofuels to achieve a given lifecycle emissions thresholds [3].
9linear in the quantity of biofuel added by the policy ( dE
d
).
The remaining terms on the right-hand side of equation (2.13) denote the unintended emissions eects
of the biofuel policy. The rst unintended eect is leakage in domestic fuel markets (Domestic Fuel). This
eect equals the lifecycle emissions of gasoline multiplied by the change in blended fuel consumption due to
biofuel policy. We refer to dF
d
 as the \output eect", which occurs if biofuel policy has an impact on the
price, and therefore the consumption, of blended fuel.
The next group of terms (Domestic Land) is leakage in domestic land markets. This eect is the emissions
from unintended changes in domestic land use due to the policy. Domestic land market leakage consists of
three components.16 The rst component is leakage from the domestic production of the food-fuel crop. This
component is equal to the change in emissions from the production of the food-fuel crop less the projected
change in emissions from the production of the food-fuel crop calculated with LCA methods. The second
component of domestic land market leakage is the change in emissions from food crop production. This
eect is the product of the lifecycle emissions of food crop production and the change in the amount of land
allocated to food crop production due to the policy. The nal component of domestic land market leakage
are the emissions from policy induced domestic land use change. This component is equal to the lifecycle
emissions benets of non-agricultural land uses, multiplied by the change in the quantity of land allocated
to non-agricultural uses.
The nal two terms (World Land and World Crude) on the right-hand side of Equation (2.13), represent
leakage in world markets. Leakage in world land markets is equal to the emissions benets of rest-of-world
land held in non-agricultural uses, multiplied by the change in world land allocated to non-agricultural uses.
Leakage in world crude oil markets equals the lifecycle emissions from crude oil consumption multiplied by
the change in world crude oil consumption due to the biofuel policy.
Expected Emissions Eects
The intended impact on emissions of any policy that increases biofuel consumption will be negative if the
lifecycle emissions of ethanol are less than the lifecycle emissions of gasoline (G > E;M + Y ~ AY ). This is
an appropriate assumption for most biofuels (Farrell et al. [10], Hill et al. [11]). However, in the presence
of leakage, the net impact of a biofuel policy on emissions is ambiguous. Further, each of the leakage terms
are not necessarily positive. Positive leakage is the standard case, where unintended emissions oset the
intended emissions of a policy. Negative leakage indicates that policy induced market adjustments generate
emissions savings additional to the intended emissions saving.
Leakage in domestic fuel markets can be negative or positive. If the output eect is positive, that is
16We note that this analysis can be extended to consider multiple agricultural crops with dierent characteristics (yields,
emissions factors) or multiple non-agricultural land uses with dierent climate benets.
10the consumption of blended fuel increased due to the policy, then leakage in domestic fuel markets is also
positive. Negative leakage in domestic fuel markets occurs when the biofuel policy reduces the consumption
of blended fuel.
The direction of leakage in domestic land markets is also unclear. We expect that LCA methods will
over estimate the amount of additional land that would be allocated to the food-fuel crop due to the policy,
that is dAY
d
 < ~ AY
dE
d
. This is because the additional food-fuel crop required for expanded biofuel production
can be diverted from other end uses, such as food production, or produced on additional land allocated
to the food-fuel crop. The LCA calculations do not consider these adjustments. In our framework, this
overestimate represents a negative leakage from food-fuel crop production.
As biofuel policy induces additional land to be dedicated to the production of the food-fuel crop, the
amount of land allocated to other agricultural crops and non-agricultural land uses decreases. The reduction
in land allocated to other crops also results in negative leakage. However, to the extent that non-agricultural
land uses provide greenhouse gas benets, the reduction in land allocated to non-agricultural results in a
positive leakage.
Leakage in world land markets and world crude oil markets are both expected to be positive. In the
framework presented here, a biofuel policy would increase the domestic demand of the food-fuel crop, and
cause the world prices of crops to increase. The land owner in country W would respond to the higher crop
prices by allocating additional land to agriculture, which would generate a positive leakage. Any biofuel policy
that reduces domestic gasoline consumption will reduce the domestic demand for crude oil. Subsequently,
the world price of crude oil PR will decline and the world consumption of crude oil will increase, resulting
in positive leakage in world crude oil markets.
3 Numerical Model
We supplement the analytical model developed above with a numerical model where the United States
is the domestic economy. Using this numerical model we are able to compute estimates of the terms of
equation (2.13) for large-scale US corn ethanol policies over the years 2009-2015. Key dierences between
the analytical and numerical model include: an explicit model of vehicle-miles-traveled which allows us to
incorporate endogenous adjustment in fuel economy which can amplify or suppress the output eect on
blended fuel; closure of the domestic government by a head tax on the domestic representative agent; the
introduction of labor in the production of ethanol, regular gasoline, and food in order to properly calibrate
the sizes of the relative sectors; and allowing domestic and international income, yields, ethanol production
technology, average fuel economy, and average crude oil prices to adjust exogenously between years in order
to provide accurate predictions of the impacts of dierent biofuel policy instruments on the various sources
11of greenhouse gas emissions over time.
This section proceeds by rst discussing the various US policies for corn ethanol that we evaluate. Second,
we present the functional forms used in our numerical model. Third, we discuss the data sources used to
identify and calibrate the model. Finally, we describe the emissions factors which translate the economic
predictions of the model into greenhouse gas emissions.
3.1 Policy Instruments Considered
The policy scenarios we consider consist of dierent combinations of two current US biofuel policies for corn
ethanol: the Volumetric Ethanol Excise Tax Credit (VEETC) and the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) for
conventional biofuels.
The VEETC is a tax credit, or input subsidy, provided to the fuel blender for each unit of ethanol used
in the production of blended fuel. The VEETC was created by the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 and
was set to its current level, $0.12/liter ($0.45/gallon), in the 2008 Farm Bill.17 The VEETC is currently
set to expire at the end of 2011. Although the VEETC and its forebears have been renewed repeatedly
in the past, there is considerable uncertainty regarding whether it will be renewed in the future given the
current legislative climate.18 For the purposes of our analysis we assume that the VEETC is maintained at
its current level through 2015.
The RFS is a set of nested quantity mandates for biofuels specied by the Energy Independence and
Security Act (EISA) of 2007, with rule-making authority provided to the US EPA. We focus on the RFS for
corn ethanol (conventional biofuels), which expands monotonically from 15.1 billion liters (4 billion gallons)
in 2006 to 56.7 billion liters (15 billion gallons) in 2015. While the RFS itself states the total amount of
ethanol that must be used, in practice the EPA annually determines the minimum share of ethanol that must
be mixed into each liter of blended fuel. The blend requirement is set such that, given projected demand for
blended fuel, the resulting total consumption of ethanol in a given year approximately equals the RFS [3,13].
Given that the RFS is implemented as a share mandate on ethanol, it follows that, when binding, the RFS
also imposes a share quota (or ceiling) on gasoline used in each liter of blended fuel.
3.2 Functional Forms
In what follows we specify functional forms for key sectors of our numerical model. We begin by outlining
those for the US (domestic) economy. The domestic model is slightly more sophisticated than that considered
in Section 2, but all of the important dimensions of adjustment remain undisturbed. Finally, we specify
the functional forms used to model the rest-of-world economy. We focus on world leakage from cropland
17Ethanol production has been subsidized in the form of an excise tax exemption since the 1978 Energy Tax Act.
18The VEETC was scheduled to expire in December of 2010, but was extended through December of 2011 as part of 2010
tax compromise [23].
12expansion and crude oil consumption, which are fully determined through two key channels, crude oil prices
and crop prices. Thus, we model these two channels explicitly, which is sucient for our purposes. We note,
however, that a more explicit treatment of world land use, including adjustments in cropland allocation,
could improve this analysis.
Consumer
The representative agent in the US19 is assumed to have preferences given by the following nested constant





























where U1, U2a, and U2b are exogenous elasticities of substitution corresponding to each nest, f1;2a;2bg;
U1;M;U2a;C;U2b;F 2 (0;1) are exogenous share parameters; and U2a and U2b are exogenous scale
parameters. Nesting utility in this way implies weak-separability between vehicle-miles-traveled20 (VMT,
M) and the demand pair (C;X). In embedding the VMT decision we permit substitutability between xed
costs of driving, H and blended fuel, F, allowing fuel economy to be endogenously determined. Both nests
permit a more accurate characterization of demand response with respect to blended fuel.
Land Use Allocation
The land owner's decision follows closely equation (2.4), except that we allow the land owner to allocate
land to ve crops as well as a single non-agricultural land use. The agricultural crops we consider are corn,
soybeans, hay, wheat, and cotton. These ve crops together make up the majority of U.S. agriculture both
in terms of area and economic value.21
The non-agricultural land use that we consider is land held in the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP),
which is the most direct substitute for cropland. The CRP is a government funded program, administered
by the USDA, which allows farmers to voluntarily take land out of agricultural production in exchanged
for rental payments.22 Given our earlier convention, we simply note for completeness that Y is corn, Z
19Here and in what follows, we again drop the subscript D on the parameters of these functions to simplify notation.
20We use \miles" and \VMT" in the description here because it follows the literature. We report values in kilometers to
maintain consistency in metric units throughout the paper.
21For each year since 1980, these ve crops have made up at least 80% of total principal crops harvested. This share has
generally been increasing over time, and was 91% in 2003. In 2003, these ve crops represent 82.7% of the total value of eld
crop production (NASS [24]).
22There are four major CRP programs, with varying contract lengths, payment rates and enrollment qualications [25].
Two of these programs, the Conservation Reserve Enhancement Program (CREP) and the Farmable Wetland Program (FWP)
target specic environmental objectives and oer higher rental rates making this land unlikely to be converted to cropland.
13is soybeans, wheat, hay and cotton and N is land held in the CRP. In what follows we simply re-use our
original i subscript to denote each of these six nal land-uses. Thus all functions in equation (2.4) remain
the same.
We assume a linear functional form for the yield (benet) functions in equation (2.4):
yi(Ai) = i   iAi (3.2)
where i is the endogenous intercept term for crop i's linear yield function and i is the exogenous slope
term for crop i's linear yield function.
To simplify matters, we assume that corn is the sole biofuel feedstock. Corn, soybeans, hay and wheat
are all used in domestic food production. Corn, soybeans, wheat and cotton are exported.
Fuel Markets
Fuel blenders produce blended fuel, equation (2.7) in the analytical model, according to the following linear
production function:
F =  FE + G (3.3)
where  F reects that we treat ethanol as if it is a per unit energy perfect substitute for gasoline.
The VEETC enters as a price wedge of magnitude sE in the input price for ethanol. When the RFS is





In the absence of the RFS, or when the RFS is not binding, we can re-specify (3.3) as implying E = FF
and G = (1    FF)F, where F is the endogenous share of ethanol in blended fuel. While no analytical
solution for E and G is possible that satises (3.4), F can be identied numerically by searching over the
subset of price equilibrium such that (3.4) is satised. In this case F is such that the per MJ price of the
two fuels is exactly equal. We also note that an increase in the VEETC, implies an increase in F, e.g.
dF
dsE > 0.
The RFS imposes the following additional constraint on fuel blenders in the US:
E  FF (3.5)
We therefore assume that only land in the remaining two major programs, general sign-up and continuous non-CREP, will be
available for conversion to cropland. Thus when we refer to `CRP' land in this paper, we are referring only the sum of these
two sub-categories.
14where F is the share mandate. We say that the RFS is binding when (3.5) binds, that is when F > F,
where the latter must be rst identied numerically.
Prot maximization under perfect competition implies that the market price that consumers pay for
blended fuel just equals the marginal cost of producing blended fuel. This has two solutions. When the RFS
is either not binding or not present, we have:
PF = (1    FF)PG + F (PE   sE) (3.6)
and when the RFS is binding we have:
PF = (1    FF)PG + F (PE   sE): (3.7)
It is now easy to see the condition when dF > 0 in (2.13). Allowing the superscripts  and  to denote
equilibrium prices under the RFS and in the absence of the RFS, respectively, we see that this occurs when
F(P
E   sE)   F(P
E   sE) is less than (1    FF)P
G   (1    FF)P
G. That is the price of blended fuel
increases when the share weighted increase in the price of ethanol is less than the share weighted decrease
in the price of gasoline. Likewise when dF < 0 the opposite is true.










where L is per liter of ethanol expenditures on labor, capital and energy, and Y is corn used in the production
of ethanol, net of co-products.23 Here E;Y and E;L are exogenous parameters that state how much of each
input is required to produce each liter of ethanol.
Reners produce regular gasoline so as to maximize prots by combining labor and crude oil according











where P;R 2 (0;1) is an exogenous share parameter, P, is an exogenous CES scale parameter, and P is
the elasticity of substitution. We assume for simplicity that the US does not domestically produce crude oil,
but imports all crude oil it requires to produce gasoline.24
23We note that co-products include dried distillers grains, corn gluten meal, corn gluten feed, and corn oil, which are
substitutes for corn and soybeans in food production. Given a coecient of conversion for each of the co-products, we deduct,
for simplicity, the corn equivalent values of co-products from E;Y .
24This assumption is easily justied because we parameterize the rest-of-world crude oil supply to include US crude oil
15Other Sectors
We assume that xed costs of driving, per unit expenditures on land production (ci), and the numeraire
good are produced linearly from labor. Food is produced from corn, soybeans, wheat, ethanol co-products
and labor. Equivalent25 corn, equivalent soybeans, wheat, hay, and labor are modeled according to a nested
CRTS CES function structured so as to permit the substitution patterns with respect to corn that are
appropriate for our analysis (according to the following ranking: soybeans>wheat>hay). Finally, to close
the behavior of the government we assume that the government raises revenue from a labor tax on the
domestic representative agent, which after nancing the VEETC and land held in CRP, is returned as a
lump-sum transfer to the agent. We note, that since leisure does not enter the utility function, that this
simplies to a non-distorting uniform head tax on the representative agent.
World Crop Demand
To model rest-of-world consumption of agricultural products, we specify the following iso-elastic inverse
excess (or import) demand functions:
Pi = i (Qi   i)
1
i (3.10)
where Qi is the amount of crop i demanded (net of supply) by the rest of the world, i is a scale parameter for
the crop i demand function, i a shift parameter for the crop i demand function, and i is the rest-of-world
excess demand elasticity for crop i. Here i corresponds to trade in agricultural products with respect to the
rest of the world, that is i includes corn, soybeans, wheat, and cotton. From the changes in crop exports, we
impute how cropland expands at the expense of non-agricultural land uses, AN, in the rest of world economy.
World Crude Oil Supply
In the current framework, we consider a highly stylized and simplistic model of crude oil supply, and that
abstracts from market power considerations with respect to the production and renement of crude oil. We
specify the inverse rest-of-world excess (or export) supply of crude oil as:
PR = R (R   R)
1
R (3.11)
where R is the amount of crude oil (net of demand) supplied by the rest of the world, R is a scale parameter,
R is a shift parameter, and R is the rest-of-world supply elasticity for crude oil. We note that by specifying
(3.11) as inverse excess supply (demand) functions, that we are implicitly specifying a combination of iso-
elastic demand and supply functions for the rest of the world.
consumption.
25Co-products are simply deducted (as perfect substitutes) from the corn and soybeans otherwise demanded by the food
sector.
163.3 Data and Calibration
Table A.1 presents the characteristics of the US economy for the calibration year, 2003. Table A.2 reports
key calibration parameters for the general economy, while Tables A.3 and A.4 display calibration parameters
for the domestic land use model. We chose the year 2003 to calibrate our model because it precedes several
anomalous years, prior to our period of analysis, where crop (NASS [24]) and crude oil prices (EIA [26]) were
well above historic levels. Also, our primary data source for agricultural input data, the USDA's Agricultural
Resource Management Survey (ARMS), is conducted for each major crop on a rotating quadrennial basis
and 2003 is the central year of a recent four year cycle.
Benchmark Economy
In 2003, US GDP was roughly $7.7 trillion, with the value of the labor and capital endowments accounting
for $2.8 trillion and $3.5 trillion respectively (BEA [27]). Net government transfers to households make
up $2,828.90 billion (BEA [27]). While not explicitly denoted in our analytical or numerical model, the
government raises revenue on the representative agent by levying a tax on labor at the rate reported in
Table A.1.
In 2003, 112.68 million hectares of cropland were allocated to the ve crops considered. Corn was the
dominant crop in terms of land area, with 31.37 million hectares, followed by soybeans, hay, wheat and
cotton. In addition to cropland, 13.57 million hectares were held in the Conservation Reserve Program.26 In
2003, the government funded CRP rental rate was 114.48 $/hectare.27 Crop prices, reported in Table A.1,
represent national average prices reported by the USDA (NASS [24]). US average yields for corn, soybeans,
hay, wheat and cotton are 8.9, 2.6, 6.1, 3.0 and 0.8 metric tons per hectare respectively (NASS [24]). Given
agricultural production costs (discussed below), the net returns from land holdings were $27.6 billion in 2003,
which is small in comparison to total GDP.
Benchmark blended fuel consumption in 2003 was 499.97 billion liters, while total regular gasoline con-
sumption was 490.28 billion liters.28 Total ethanol consumption was 10.39 billion liters [29]. The 2003 price
of regular gasoline, 0.23 $/liter, represents the consumption weighted US average spot price for all grades
of conventional gasoline from [26]. We compute a spot price for ethanol in 2003 of 0.35 $/liter. This price
consists of the marginal cost of ethanol production less the value of co-products sold to food producers, plus
the average cost of transporting ethanol to end users. We note that this is very close to the average 2003
26This is the sum of land held in the general sign-up and continuous non-CREP CRP programs and accounts for close to 95%
of total land held as CRP [25]. This intentionally excludes those categories of CRP land which are not likely to be converted
back into crop production, given the higher rental payments that are received or the services they provide, such as rare habitat
conservation, riparian buers, etc.
27This value was computed from the USDA Farm Service Agency reports [28] and represents the weighted average annual
rental payment to land in the general sign-up and non-CREP continuous sign-up programs.
28Our value for total regular gasoline consumption is slightly higher than the volume reported by the FHWA [29].
17spot price for deliveries to Omaha, Nebraska which was 0.36 $/liter [30].29 Given benchmark quantities
and prices of gasoline and ethanol, the 2003 price of blended fuel, inclusive of the fuel tax and pre-existing
VEETC, was 0.41 $/liter.
Consumer
We specify an elasticity of substitution between miles and non-mile expenditures, U1, of 0.50, between food
and the numeraire good, U2a, of 0.09, and between fuel and non-fuel expenditures on driving, U2b, of 0.21.
These imply a calibrated own-price elasticity of demand for miles of -0.53, an own-price elasticity of demand
for food of -0.12, and an own-price elasticity of demand for blended fuel of -0.34.
Our calibrated own-price elasticity of demand for miles is intentionally more elastic than literature values
for the (negative) of the elasticity of VMT with respect to the price of fuel. Summaries of this literature
(see [31{33]) report means for short-run estimates between -0.10 and -0.26 and long-run estimates of -0.26
and -0.31. More recent estimates (Small and Vendender [34]) report short-run elasticities between -0.045
and -0.022. Given that we assume that fuel expenditures represent 40% of the total cost of driving, following
Parry and Small [20], our short-run calibrated estimate of the elasticity of VMT with respect to the price of
fuel is on the higher end of the literature at -0.21, but consistent with Parry and Small [20]. Our calibrated
own-price elasticity of demand for blended fuel is on the high end of recent empirical estimates (Small and
Van Dender [34] and US DOE [35]).
Estimates of the own-price elasticity of food demand are considerably more sparse. Our estimate is
roughly consistent with the estimates of [36], who estimates the own price elasticity for a broad consumption
group of \food, beverages and tobacco" in the range of -0.075 to -0.098.
Land Use Allocation
To construct the per unit land labor expenditures for agricultural production (ci), we sum expenditures
over four broad input categories: labor, capital energy and fertilizer (Table A.3). Expenditures on labor
and capital are from the USDA's Commodity, Costs and Returns (CCR) [37]. Capital expenditures include
interest on operating capital and the capital recovery of machinery and equipment. Labor expenditures
include the wages and the opportunity costs of unpaid workers.
We construct energy and fertilizer expenditures from more detailed input use data and subsequently use
this data to calculate crop specic emissions factors (discussed below). Our estimates for energy expenditures
are aggregates of expenditures on diesel, gasoline, natural gas, electricity and liqueed petroleum gas. Diesel
29The transportation cost term is necessary to reconcile the spatial concentration of historical spot price data for ethanol.
Historic ethanol price data is limited. Most spot prices for ethanol are reported as the price of FOB (free-on-board) deliveries
to various rural locations in the Midwest, where ethanol has historically been produced. Spot prices to locations outside of the
Midwest exist only for the last few years. Since our spot price for regular gasoline reects the national average, it is necessary
to adjust the price of ethanol to reect deliveries of ethanol across the country.
18use for each crop was derived from West and Marland [38] and Nelson et al. [39]. Crop specic use of the other
energy sources were derived from the lifecycle analysis literature (Farrell et al. [10], Hill et al. [11], Piringer and
Steinberg [40]). Fertilizer expenditures represent expenditures on all variable inputs that are not categorized
as energy, capital or labor and are constructed from two main sources. First, expenditures on nitrogen,
phosphorus, and potassium fertilizer, pesticide and seed are calculated using crop level input use data from
the USDA's ARMS dataset [41] and national prices from the USDA's ERS [42].30 Second, expenditures on
other variable inputs are from the CCR [37].31 The fertilizer expenditure variable is disaggregated in the
lower panel of Table A.3.
Land Supply Elasticities
The six i in (3.2) determine the supply response of the US land market. We estimate the i using a
method that advances the `full-solution' method used by Ferreyra [43].32 Our estimation strategy exploits
the implied land supply elasticities between multiple equilibrium solutions. This proceeds in a recursive
manner whereby the previous equilibrium solution (t 1) is exogenous to the current (t) identication of the
parameter vector 
t and thus also the current equilibrium solution.33 Given these two equilibrium solutions
we compute the implied land supply elasticity, searching for the 
t that minimizes the Euclidean distance
between this estimate and elasticities estimates taken from the literature. Literature estimates are reported
in Table A.4 and are assumed xed throughout.
We believe that this estimation strategy provides two main benets. First, it ensures proper calculation
of the counter-factual amount of ethanol that would be produced in the absence of various biofuels policies.
Second, it allows for the proper calculation of the domestic emissions leakage related to land-use change. We
refer the interested reader to Bento and Landry [45] for a detailed exposition of our estimation strategy, as
well details on model validation given this approach.
Fuel Markets
The ratio of the energy content of ethanol to gasoline,  F = 0:67, is based on low heating values from
GREET 1.8c [12]. We note that our linear specication for the production of blended fuel is not identied
30Input data for hay is not available in the ARMS, so fertilization rates were collected from extension reports from institutions
in major hay producing regions. Application levels were based on recommendations given a medium or optimal soil test.
31This includes expenditures on soil conditioners, manure, custom operations, repairs, purchased irrigation water, taxes and
insurance, and general farm overhead.
32While most strategies for estimating the parameters of large-scale computable general equilibrium models involve two
stages|a rst stage whereby historical data is used to estimate a sub-portion of the model's parameters, or simply the parameter
vector of interest, and a second stage where the parameter vector is xed and the model itself is solved for an equilibrium (See
Bento et al. [44] for a recent application). `Full solution' methods estimate a parameter vector through an iterative process that
computes a separate equilibrium solution for each attempted parameter vector.
33We identify the rst parameter vector for t = 0, by considering a small exogenous increase in ethanol over the amount
realized in the calibration year, which is the equilibrium that is presumed exogenous for identication. For t > 0, we estimate
a baseline series of parameter vectors, treating the previous year's baseline as exogenous for identication. In addition, we also
estimate a post-policy series of parameter vectors that treat the current year's baseline as exogenous for identication.
19on the basis of an estimate of the elasticity of blended fuel. This is to our advantage, as the elasticity of
blended fuel will be determined unencumbered by the underlying elasticities of gasoline and ethanol.
The per unit ethanol input requirements in equation (3.8), are calibrated to reect an average ethanol
production facility in the US. In 2003, we assume that the net of co-products corn to ethanol conversion
ratio was 1.86 kg/liter (GREET 1.8c [12]).34 Labor inputs to ethanol production are calculated as total
expenditures on energy, labor and capital for ethanol production. Additional calibration details are available
in Appendix A.2.
We assume an elasticity of substitution between crude oil and a composite of labor and capital, P, of
0.06. This was selected to approximate a perfectly complementary relationship between crude oil and labor,
preventing any unrealistic substitution of crude oil for labor.
Rest of World Crude Supply
We consider only that fraction of crude oil that is used to produce regular gasoline.35 Therefore, our
parametrization of the supply of crude oil, only reects the share of crude oil that is available for the
production of regular gasoline. We use a central elasticity of crude oil supply, R, of 0.50. This value is
calculated using literature values for the elasticity of world demand and supply for crude oil, -0.03 and 0.04
respectively,36 and crude oil consumption and production statistics from the EIA [49].
Rest of World Crop Demand
The crop export demand elasticities, i in equations (3.10), are set to -0.65, -0.60, -0.55, and -0.75 for
corn, soybeans, wheat and cotton respectively, which represent the central values reported in Gardiner and
Dixit [50].
3.4 Emissions Factors
The emissions factors corresponding to the 's in equations (2.12) are (2.13) are presented in Table A.5
and are described in detail below. For each product or activity, we account for the release of three major
greenhouse gases, carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4) and nitrous oxide (N2O) measured in units of
carbon dioxide equivalents (CO2e).37. For all emissions factors, we abstract from infrastructure related
emissions. For example, we measure the emissions from the operation of an ethanol production facility, but
do not include emissions from the construction of, or the raw materials used to construct, the facility itself.
34The production of ethanol requires corn inputs of 2.56 kg/liter, however co-products equivalent to 0.7 kg corn are produced
with each liter of ethanol (GREET 1.8c [12]).
35In practice, less than half (47%) of a barrel of crude oil is used to produce regular gasoline. In addition, after processing
crude oil into its nal products the sum volume of the nal products is 5% greater than a barrel, which is known as the
processing gain.
36Estimates include Greene [46] and [47] for crude oil demand, and Greene [46] and OECD [48] for crude oil supply. We
note that our elasticities are conservative estimates from the literature.
37We use global warming potentials from IPCC Third Assessment Report [51] to calculate CO2e.
20As a result, our emissions system boundary is slightly more restrictive that that of earlier lifecycle analysis
studies (see for example [52], [11], [10]), but consistent with the US EPA [16].
Gasoline
The lifecycle emissions of gasoline, G, are 3.0 kgCO2e/liter, which is the baseline lifecycle emissions for
US gasoline estimated by NETL [21]. This factor was estimated for US EPA for use in the Regulatory
Impact Analysis [16] of the RFS and in the RFS Final Rule [53]. The sources of emissions include: crude
oil extraction, transport and rening, the transportation and distribution of nished gasoline and tailpipe
emissions [21]. Rening emissions include the production and consumption of purchased energy, still gas
combustion, hydrogen production, aring and venting.
Ethanol Production and Combustion
The lifecycle emissions from ethanol production, E;M, are assumed to be 0.6 kgCO2e/liter (US EPA [16]).
This factor is estimated based on the projected per unit conditional factor demand for natural gas and
electricity of a representative natural gas red dry-mill ethanol plant (US EPA [16]).
Although we assumed that E;C = 0 in the analytical model, we measure the release of CH4 and N2O from
ethanol combustion, which total 0.02 gCO2e/liter (US EPA [16]). The assumption that the CO2 released
during ethanol combustion is completely oset by carbon uptake during the growing of corn does not hold
for other greenhouse gases.
Using 2003 corn yields and our benchmark corn-to-ethanol conversion eciency, the lifecycle estimate for
the amount of land allocated to corn production required to produce one unit of ethanol, ~ Ay, is 0.21 ha/1000
liters.38 The resulting lifecycle emissions of corn ethanol are therefore 1.29 kgCO2e/liter. Therefore, we
estimate that ethanol generates lifecycle emissions savings of 35% relative to gasoline on an energy equivalent
basis, which is consistent with estimates for natural gas red ethanol production (Farrell et al. [10]; Wang [12])
International Crude Oil Consumption
We assume that emissions from non-US crude oil consumption, R, are 369 kgCO2e/barrel. We derive this
factor from petroleum consumption and emissions data published by the EIA [49]. Implicit in this factor are
EIA assumptions regarding the non-US end uses of crude oil and the average chemical properties of crude
oil.39 We do not consider the lifecycle emissions associated with upgrading crude oil to nal consumption
products.
38We account for a co-product rebate here, following standard lifecycle analysis methods, which assigns a corn equivalence
value to the co-products of ethanol production. The co-product rebate reduces ~ Ay by approximately 0.8 ha/1000 liters.
39We estimate emissions from crude oil consumption in this manner because: 1) The chemical properties, and therefore the
embodied emissions, of crude oil are very heterogeneous; and 2) not all crude is converted into products that are combusted.
For example, reneries produce a number of fuels (gasoline, diesel, kerosene among others) as well as other products (asphalt,
lubricating oil) in a joint production process. Products such as asphalt are never combusted, so the carbon in these products
is not released as CO2.
21Agricultural Production
The production of corn is at least twice as emissions intensive (3.2 mgCO2e/ha) than each of the other
crops we consider (Table A.5). In comparison, hay and wheat production generate only 1.3 mgCO2e/ha
and 1.0 mgCO2e/ha respectively, while soybean production generates 0.5 mgCO2e/ha. These crop-specic
emissions factors are constructed using our agricultural input and expenditures dataset (discussed above).
We consider on-farm sources of emissions, which include agricultural N2O, energy use and liming, as well
as emissions from agricultural input production. A detailed discussion of the assumptions underlying these
emissions factors is in Appendix A.3.
Domestic Land Use Change
We assume that the emissions from converting land held in CRP to cropland, N;D, are 2.3 mgCO2e/ha.
To calculate this factor we assume, following the US EPA [16], that the conversion of CRP land to cropland
results in the immediate release of all carbon stored in the above-ground biomass on CRP land. Further,
the carbon stored in below-ground biomass and soils of CRP land is released within the next 30 years.
Consistent with standard practice (see for example the US EPA [16]), we amortize total emissions from land
use conversion over 30 years. To construct our emissions factor we assume that CRP land is abandoned
cropland planted to perennial grasses for 15 years, which store 30.51 mgCO2e/ha in above and below ground
biomass and 37.95 mgCO2e/ha in soils (Fargione et al. [14]).40
World Land Use Change
We assume that the emissions from the expansion of non-US cropland, N;W, is 8.0 mgCO2e/ha (US
EPA [16]). This factor includes carbon released from the above- and below-ground biomass and soils of
land converted to agriculture, as well as foregone sequestration. We again amortize all emissions over 30
years. See Appendix A.3 for further details. We emphasize that the emissions from world land use change are
substantially larger than the emissions from domestic land use change. This is because cropland expansion
in the rest of the world is predicted to displace previously undisturbed land cover with large carbon stocks.
In absence of a fully specied world land use model, we linearly relate reductions in US crop exports to
reductions in world agricultural land. Specically, we assume that 44%, 50%, 47% and 50% of reduced US
corn, soybean, wheat and cotton exports are replaced by expanded agricultural production in the rest of the
world at non-US average yields (See appendix A.3 for more details). The purpose of this calculation is to
isolate the world crop supply response without explicitly calculating land use model. We note that other
40We focus on the conversion of grasslands to cropland because while biomass on CRP land can take a number of dierent
forms, in 2007 at least 77% of continuous signup CPR was classied as native or introduced grasses (Barbarika [25]). Also,
given the costs of converting forested land to cropland, it is CRP held in grassland that will likely be converted to cropland. If
CRP lands containing woody biomass are converted to cropland then emissions due to biomass loss could be much larger.




The numerical model generates a time path of economic outcomes at one year intervals between 2009 and
2015. To account for underlying dynamic trends that alter our emissions calculations, we allow for domestic
and international income, average fuel economy, crop yields, average crude oil prices, and ethanol production
technology to adjust exogenously.
We assume that household income grows at an annual rate of 1 percent.41 International income growth
is modeled through increased world demand for US crop exports. Following historical average annual growth
in crop exports over the years 2000-2009 (USDA [54]), we allow exports to grow by 1.13%, 2.70%, 0.21%,
and 1.65% for corn, soybeans, wheat, and cotton, respectively.
We allow fuel economy to exogenously increase by 0.22% per year. This trend is based fuel economy
projections from the 2002 National Research Council analysis of CAFE standards [55] and vehicle eet
composition from (Bento et al. [44]).
The price of crude oil follows the Reference Scenario projections of the 2008 EIA Annual Energy Out-
look [56], increasing monotonically from 63.37$/bbl in 2009 to 73.85$/bbl in 2015.
In 2009 our crop yields match observed average US yields reported by the USDA [24]. For the years
2010-2015, yields for all crops except hay follow USDA projections [57]. These projections are not linear,
but in general are monotonically increasing. Relative to the benchmark year of 2003, corn and cotton yields
increase by roughly 20% by 2015 while soybean yields increase by 16%. Wheat yields increase only 1%
over the same time period. Hay yields are allowed to increase by the average annual growth rate between
the years 1990-2008, or 0.24% per year. CRP rental rates increase by 2% a year, matching historic trends
(FSA [28]). Improvements in international crop yields follow USDA projections.
We allow ethanol production technology to improve following US EPA projections [16]. We allow the
labor requirements of ethanol production fall by 50% between 2003 and 2015. This improvement is driven
by increasing energy eciency of ethanol production due to a considerable expansion in ecient dry mill
ethanol production (US EPA [16]). The corn-to-ethanol conversion ratio also improves monotonically. In
2015, the US average ethanol conversion eciency is 0.42 liters/kg, which is 6% higher than the 2003 value.
41That is to say that we allow  L to grow at 1% per year.
23Scenarios Considered
We consider two counterfactual baselines in our analysis. The no-policy baseline, is a counterfactual in which
there are no pre-existing ethanol policies. Against this counterfactual baseline we consider three policy
regimes. Scenario 1 considers the impact of adding the VEETC alone. Scenario 2 considers the impact of
the imposing the RFS alone. Finally, Scenario 3 considers the impact of imposing the RFS jointly with the
VEETC.
The VEETC baseline, is a counterfactual in which the VEETC is the sole pre-existing ethanol policy.
We compare two policy regimes to the VEETC baseline. Scenario 4 removes the pre-existing VEETC while
simultaneously imposing the RFS. Scenario 5 imposes the RFS on top of the pre-existing VEETC.
In the tables and discussion below, we focus on results for the years 2009, 2012 and 2015. To conclude
the results discussion we report the emissions results for all years, 2009 to 2015, in Figure 1.
4.1 Economic Impacts of Policies
Impact of Policies on New Ethanol
Table 1 presents the amount of ethanol consumed under our two counterfactual baselines, as well as the
change in ethanol consumption relative to these two baselines, that occur under each policy scenario.
The no-policy baseline is provided in the rst row of Table 1. The predicted baseline gradually increases
over time, from 21.3 billion liters in 2009, to 31.5 billion liters by 2015. This increase is due to several factors,
but the two most important are exogenous increases in the price of crude oil and growth in crop yields. The
increasing crude oil price makes ethanol a relatively more attractive substitute for regular gasoline, thus
driving up the equilibrium quantity of ethanol. Rising crop yields lower crop prices and consequently the
marginal cost of producing ethanol, thus driving up the equilibrium quantity of ethanol.
The VEETC (scenario 1), by lowering the marginal cost of ethanol relative to the marginal cost of
gasoline, increases the amount of ethanol realized in the economy. It is this wedge of additional consumption
that is reported in Table 1. In 2012, for instance, the VEETC increases ethanol consumption by 19 billion
liters over the amount predicted under the no-policy baseline.
Scenario (2) illustrates that the RFS also drives up the amount of ethanol used in the economy, relative
to the no-policy baseline. In all years the quantity of ethanol mandated by the RFS exceeds the amount that
would be produced in the absence of the mandate, that is to say that the RFS is binding for those years.
For 2009, comparison of scenarios (1) against (2) demonstrates that the VEETC and RFS achieve parity
in promoting additional ethanol in the economy, either policy or generates the same amount of additional
ethanol, about 19 billion liters.
Scenario (3) demonstrates that imposing the VEETC in conjunction with the RFS has no additional
24impact on the amount of ethanol induced in the economy. Again, for 2009 we have parity. While for the
later years, given that the RFS imposes an additional increase in ethanol above what is added by the VEETC
alone, it is the RFS that is the policy instrument that is determining the amount of ethanol realized in the
economy. As a consequence the amount of ethanol added to the economy for the later years under scenarios
(2) and (3), is the same, approximately 25 billion liters.
The second baseline, the VEETC baseline, is provided in row ve. In eect this is the same as appending
the VEETC scenario (1) to the no-scenario baseline. As before, rising crude oil prices and crop yields drive
up the amount of ethanol realized in the economy from 40.1 billion liters in 2009 to 45.4 billion liters by
2015.
Compared to the VEETC baseline, the RFS is not binding in 2009, and binding in all years thereafter, it
is not surprising that replacing the VEETC with the RFS (scenario 4) achieves the same amount of additional
ethanol as simply imposing the RFS while continuing the VEETC (scenario 5). Both scenarios show that
relative to an economy with a pre-existing VEETC, the RFS drives up the amount of ethanol realized in the
economy by 6 billion liters in 2012, and 11 billion liters by 2015.
Impacts on Land Use
Table 1 establishes that each scenario has a positive impact on ethanol consumption, and would therefore be
expected to generate greenhouse gas reductions. We start decomposing the sources of leakage by analyzing
the impact of each scenario on US and world land use.
The top three panels of Table 2 report the allocation of US agricultural land to corn, other crops and
CRP in the two counterfactual baselines, and the impact of each scenario on the land allocation. The nal
panel reports the change in world non-agricultural land, which represents world land use change.
In the no-policy baseline, land allocated to corn gradually increases from 30.5 million hectares in 2009 to
31.7 million hectares in 2015. Across the no-policy baseline both land allocated to other crops and held in
the CRP fall. The trends in domestic land use are similar in the VEETC baseline.
The primary domestic land use response in each scenario is an expansion in the land allocated to corn
production, which is driven by the increased demand for corn for ethanol consumption, The magnitudes of
the changes in corn production mirror the changes in ethanol consumption; larger in ethanol consumption
lead to larger expansions of corn production. Comparing scenarios (1) and (2) for the years 2012 and 2015,
the VEETC has a smaller impact on corn production than the RFS because the VEETC had a smaller
impact on ethanol consumption. Further, scenarios (4) and (5), which compare to the the VEETC baseline,
have a much smaller percentage impact on corn production than the three scenarios that compare to the
no-policy baseline. To accommodate increased corn production, land allocated to the production of other
25crops and to CRP decreases. Given that the quantity of land in the US is xed, it follows that scenarios
that cause larger increases in corn production must have result in larger reductions in land allocated to the
production of other crops and CRP. Again, the reductions in other crops and CRP are much smaller in
scenarios (4) and (5) than in the rst three scenarios.
Perhaps more important is how the reductions in the production of non-corn crops compares to the
reductions in CRP land. Although smaller in terms of percentage relative to baseline, in each scenario the
total hectare reduction in other crop production is larger than total hectare reduction in land allocated to
the CRP. Focusing on scenario (1), in 2009 other crop production falls by 2.8% relative to the baseline of
81.6 million hectares which is a larger drop than the 7% reduction in CRP land relative to its 13.6 million
hectare base. In fact, across all scenarios the reductions in land alloctated to other crops is consistently more
than twice the reduction in land allocated to CRP. This illustrates the the primary margin of adjustment
in domestic land markets is a shift to corn from other aricultural production rather than an expansion in
cropland. This is critical from an emissions perspective because reductions in non-corn crop production
reduces emissions, while reductions in CRP generate emissions.
The aggregate world land use response to each scenario is a reduction in non-agricultural land, or equiv-
alently an expansion in world cropland. As with the domestic land use, the magnitude of the world land
use response (displayed in the nal panel of Table 2) follows the increase in ethanol consumption the results
in each scenario. This is because the world land use eect is driven by the linkages between US and the
rest of the world through world crop markets. The increased demand for corn due to expanded ethanol
consumption results in a reduction in US crop exports. Corn exports fall because the increased demand for
corn for ethanol production diverts corn away from being exported. Exports of non-corn crops fall because
ethanol policies cause an overall reduction in production to non-corn crops in the US. Reductions in US
exports cause an increase in the world price of crops and a supply response by farmers in the rest of the
world.
As the overall land use impacts of each scenario are driven by the changes in ethanol consumption, when
the RFS binds, the addition or removal of the VEETC will have no impact on land use. Specically, scenarios
(4) and (5) have identical impacts on land use in each year even though the VEETC is absent in scenario
(4). Likewise scenarios (2) and (3) have identical land use impacts in 2012 and 2015.
Impacts on Fuel Prices
We next focus on the drivers in leakage in fuel markets. Table 3 highlights the impact of the various policies
on the prices realized in fuel markets. The price of the two inputs into blended fuel production, ethanol and
gasoline, are reported in panels one and two, while the price of blended fuel is reported in panel three.
26Due to the growth in crude oil prices, the price of ethanol under the no-scenario baseline is gradually
increasing over time. Against this baseline, the VEETC (scenario 1) unequivocally lowers the price of ethanol
realized in the economy, by -19% in 2009 when the baseline price is lower, to -15% in 2015 when the baseline
price is higher. Given that the RFS forces fuel blenders to mix more of an input that is increasing in costs,
the RFS (scenario 2) drives up the price of ethanol. The increase in ethanol price grows from 14% in 2009
to 34% in 2015, largely in tandem with the increase in the amount of ethanol consumption induced by the
policy. Imposing the RFS in conjunction with the VEETC (scenario 3), implies the same price eect in
2009 as in scenario (1), given that the RFS is not binding. However, for the later years in which the RFS is
binding, the inclusion of the VEETC acts to soften the price increases induced by imposing the RFS alone.
For 2012 this implies a net decline in the price of ethanol of -11%, while for 2015 this implies a net increase
in the price of ethanol by 2%.
Compared to the VEETC baseline, maintaining the RFS in isolation (scenario 4) implies a greater price
increase than when the RFS is added on top of the pre-existing VEETC (scenario 5).
While the two policy instruments have immediate repercussions with respect to the price of ethanol, the
impact of these policies on the price of gasoline and blended fuel is not always clear.
Given that the VEETC is received by fuel blenders, the VEETC operates to shift the fuel blender's input
demand for ethanol towards the origin. As a result of changing the relative prices of the two inputs, the fuel
blender reduces the amount of gasoline it mixes into each gallon of blended fuel in order to take advantage
of the now cheaper alternative, ethanol. This changes the proportion of ethanol going into blended fuel
(and in parallel the proportion of gasoline going into blended fuel), which we dene here as the composition
eect. In the case of the VEETC this change in the input mix is determined wholly through the price
mechanism|ethanol is now cheaper relative to gasoline, and so the blender demands more of it|and thus
is a consequence of the economic equilibrium realized from adding the VEETC to the economy.
In addition to the composition eect, by subsidizing the price of one of the inputs used in the production
of blended fuel, the VEETC lowers the marginal cost of producing blended fuel, in eect shifting the supply
of blended fuel downward away from the price axis.42 Consequently, given this lower price, consumers will
respond by increasing their total consumption of blended fuel, leading to a secondary output eect which,
for the case of the VEETC, unequivocally expands the amount of blended fuel realized in the economy.
Given that the composition eect operates to lower the share of gasoline in each gallon of blended fuel,
but that the output eect operates to raise the total amount of blended fuel in the economy, it will generally
be the case that the amount of ethanol added to the economy as a result of the VEETC will be greater than
42By a smaller vertical distance than the VEETC on the demand side, given that this vertical distance is a function of the
share of ethanol implied at each increment of the price axis for blended fuel and the VEETC.
27the amount by which gasoline falls. Against the no-scenario baseline, the VEETC leads to a fall in the price
of gasoline of -4% when the baseline price is low, to -2% when the baseline price is high (scenario 1). Not
surprisingly, given that the input prices of both fuels decline under the VEETC (scenario 1), the price of
blended fuel also declines from 3% in 2009 to 2% in 2015 (composition eect net of output eect).
While the RFS itself is a quantity mandate, specifying the total amount of ethanol that must be blended
into blended fuel, in practice, the RFS is imposed as a share mandate, specifying the precise amount of
ethanol that is to be blended into each liter of blended fuel. What this latter representation makes clear is
that, since gasoline is the only other input in blended fuel, one less this share standard, is the implied share
quota on gasoline.43
Thus, while the VEETC aects the composition of blended fuel indirectly by lowering the prices of one of
the inputs used in the production of blended fuel, the RFS directly manipulates the composition of ethanol
in blended fuel (and in parallel, that of gasoline), irrespective of the resulting impact on the input prices
of ethanol and gasoline. The net impact of these dueling price changes and their resulting impact on the
marginal cost of blended fuel, however, is not inconsequential as this determines whether the output eect
implied by the RFS is positive (as is the case always for the VEETC), or negative. That is to say, whether
the RFS increases the amount of blended fuel realized in the economy, or decreases it.
While the share mandate on ethanol operates to increase the equilibrium price of ethanol, and thus raise
the marginal cost of producing blended fuel, the implied share quota on gasoline operates to decrease the
equilibrium price of gasoline, and thus to lower the marginal cost of producing blended fuel. Which of these
competing price eects dominates the nal realized equilibrium price of blended fuel depends on the relative
slopes of the two input supply functions, which, given our assumptions of CRTS in both the production of
ethanol and regular gasoline, are largely determined in our model by the supply elasticity of corn, and the
supply elasticity of crude oil, respectively.
If the slope of the input demand function for gasoline is steeper than the slope for ethanol (reecting
the fact that the elasticity of crude oil supply is relatively less elastic than the supply elasticity for corn),
than a small decline in the amount of gasoline demanded will result in a greater price decline, than the price
increase resulting from an equally small increase in the amount of ethanol demanded. In addition, given that
gasoline is the dominant input in blended fuel production, in order for the price of blended fuel to increase as
a result of the RFS, the percentage increase in the price of ethanol must be more than ten times larger than
the percentage decrease in the price of regular gasoline. Thus, while the RFS alone (scenario 2) drives up
43We are intentionally precise with our language here. We use the term `share mandate' to refer to quantity requirements
that are intended to characterize the minimum amount of ethanol in each gallon of blended fuel, and `implied share quota' to
characterize the fact that the legislation indirectly restricts the maximum amount of gasoline that can be blended into each
gallon of blended fuel.
28the price of ethanol by 14 to 34% relative to the no-scenario baseline, the fall in the price of regular gasoline
is from -4 to -6%, and thus the net eect is a decline in the price of blended fuel of about 1%.
In scenario 3 the fall in the price of gasoline induced by the implied share quota is roughly the same as
that induced by the RFS alone (scenario 2), or -4 to -5%. However, given that imposing the RFS alongside
the VEETC (scenario 3) considerably softens the increase in the price of ethanol induced by the RFS (in
fact, recall that this leads to a decline in the price of ethanol for 2012) when the RFS is binding, as well as
the fact that the share of gasoline is ten times that of ethanol, the net eect is dominated by the fall in the
price of gasoline. As a consequence the price of blended fuel falls by -3% (scenario 3). This is is roughly two
to three times the fall induced by the RFS alone (scenario 2).44
Turning to the VEETC baseline, the disparity between imposing the RFS while removing the VEETC
(scenario 4) and imposing the RFS in on top of the pre-existing VEETC (scenario 5) becomes even more
apparent. As the third panel shows, the price of blended fuel actually increases the price of blended fuel
by 1% when the RFS is binding (scenario 4). This arises due to the fact that the increase in the price of
ethanol by 51 to 59% exceeds by more than ten times the fall in the price of gasoline of -2 to -3%. This is in
sharp contrast to simply imposing the RFS on top of the pre-existing VEETC (scenario 5), which implies a
decline in the price of blended fuel of roughly half a percentage point, relative to the VEETC baseline. In
this case, the VEETC osets the increase in the price of ethanol induced by the RFS, eectively cutting the
increase in the price of ethanol down to 10 to 20%, when the RFS is binding (scenario 5). This is less than
ten times the fall in the price of gasoline of -1.3 to -2.5%, and thus the net eect is for the price of blended
fuel to fall.
Impacts on Fuel Quantities
Table 4, which presents the impacts of the various policies considered on the amount of the various fuels
realized in the economy. The rst panel on ethanol quantities reiterates the results from Table 1, here
reporting the wedge of additional ethanol realized under each policy scenario in percentage terms, relative
to the pertinent baseline.
The second panel reports the impacts of the various policies on the amount of gasoline realized in the
economy. The magnitudes reported here parallel the impacts of the various policy scenarios on the price
of regular gasoline discussed earlier. Given that the RFS alone (scenario 2), raises the price of ethanol by
a greater degree than when the VEETC ameliorates the price consequences of the RFS (scenario 3), the
44In fact, when one normalizes the percentage fall in the price of blended fuel by the amount of additional ethanol realized
due to the policy from Table 1, we see that scenario 3 drives down the price of blended fuel per unit of additional ethanol by an
amount that is greater than the same for the VEETC alone (scenario 1). For 2012, for instance, this implies  2:4%
18:9 =  0:13%
per billion liters of new ethanol, for the VEETC alone (scenario 1), and  3:4%
24:3 =  0:14% per billion liters of new ethanol for
the RFS plus VEETC (scenario 3). This is not surprising. The VEETC neutralizes the price increase in ethanol induced by
the RFS, leaving only the second policy implied by the RFS to drive the fall in the price in blended fuel.
29implied impact on the price of blended fuel implies a greater output eect under scenario 3, than under
scenario 2. Since blended fuel used expands when the VEETC is paired with the RFS (scenario 3), the
displacement of gasoline is smaller, only -2% relative to the no-scenario baseline, than when the RFS is
imposed alone (scenario 2), which results in a displacement of gasoline of -3%. Against the VEETC baseline
similar patterns emerge. When the RFS replaces the VEETC (scenario 4), gasoline use falls by -1.5 to -2.2%
for a binding RFS. When the RFS is imposed on top of the pre-existing VEETC (scenario 5), fewer liters of
gasoline are displaced, -0.8 to -1.5%.
The third panel presents the impacts of the various policies on the amount of blended fuel realized in
the economy. Against the no-scenario baseline, the VEETC alone (scenario 1) induces a larger increase
in blended fuel consumption of 0.8 to 1.2%, than the RFS alone (scenario 2), 0.5 to 0.6%; this is despite
the fact, that the amount of ethanol induced by the RFS is the same or greater than that induced by the
VEETC. A benecial output eect (one that reduces blended fuel consumption, and consequently works in
a direction to further reduce emissions) is largely driven by the rate at which the price of ethanol increases
relative to the decrease in the price of gasoline. In fact, given that ethanol is roughly one-tenth of a liter of
blended fuel, this rate needs to be greater than 10, in order for the price of blended fuel to increase, and the






 > 10, implies %PF > 0, and thus
also %F < 0. However, when the VEETC is paired with the RFS (scenario 3) the increase in the price of
ethanol is reversed or substantially muted, leaving the fall in the price of gasoline to be the primary driver
leading to the fall in the the price of blended fuel. As a consequence, it is not surprising that blended fuel
increases by 1.2 to 1.4% when the RFS is paired with the VEETC (scenario 3).45. Again, comparison against
the VEETC baseline further highlights the sharp contrast in the output eect induced by the two policy
instruments. Removing the VEETC while simultaneously imposing the RFS (scenario 4) implies a benecial
output eect, that is a fall in the amount of blended fuel realized in the economy by -0.5%. Again, allowing
the VEETC to continue alongside the RFS (scenario 5), implies an increase in the amount of blended fuel
realized in the economy by 0.1 to 0.2%, when the RFS is binding. Thus, from the perspective of current
policy, if leakage is highly correlated with a large positive output eect in fuel markets, then allowing the
VEETC to continue alongside the RFS is clearly sub-optimal.
45In fact, scenario 3 implies a larger increase in blended fuel than scenario 1, the VEETC alone. This is not surprising. First,
imposing the RFS implies a larger ethanol wedge than when imposing the VEETC alone. Secondly, for 2009 and 2012, the RFS
plus VEETC leads to a decline in the price of ethanol, which amplies the fall in the price in gasoline induced by the fall in
the implied share quota for gasoline, thus amplifying the impact on blended fuel beyond that which would be possible with the
VEETC alone. For 2015, however, adding the VEETC alongside the RFS does not lead to a fall in the price of ethanol, rather
increases it slightly, thus softening the impact on blended fuel relative to the VEETC. This is clear when one controls for the
rst point, by normalizing the increase in blended fuel by the wedge in ethanol induced by the various policies. For 2012, for
instance, for every 1% increase in new ethanol, blended fuel increases by 0.0135 % under the VEETC alone (scenario 1), and
by 0.0148 for the VEETC plus RFS case (scenario 3). However, by 2015, when the RFS plus VEETC implies a slight increase
in the price of ethanol, each 1% increase in new ethanol implies an increase in blended fuel by 0.0172 % for the VEETC alone
(scenario 1), and 0.0162%, for the VEETC plus RFS (scenario 3).
30Table 5 presents the impact of various policy scenarios on crude oil markets. We note that the price
impacts of these policies almost perfectly parallel those for gasoline, given the assumptions of the numerical
model, and thus are omitted here. Given that all of the ethanol policies considered here lower the price
of gasoline and thus crude oil, each reduction in US crude oil consumption corresponds to an opportunity
to expand crude oil consumption by the rest of the world. This price impact permeates only through the
demand side of the world crude oil market. Against the no-scenario baseline, the VEETC alone (scenario
1) implies a decline in US demand for crude oil of -1 to -2%. The RFS either alone or in conjunction with
the VEETC, implies a fall in US demand for crude oil of -2 to -3%. When compared against the VEETC
baseline, the RFS (scenarios 4 and 5) imply a reduction in US demand for crude oil of -1 to -2%, again given
the smaller amount of new ethanol added to the economy relative to the pre-existing VEETC. Given that the
amount of crude oil demanded by the ROW is considerably greater than that used by the US, these policies
imply an increase in ROW demand for crude oil of 0.1% against the no-scenario baseline, and between 0.0
to 0.1%, against the VEETC baseline. In either case, what at rst appear to be emissions savings from
reducing US crude oil demand are partially reversed by a multiplier eect with regard to ROW demand for
crude oil, that is largely determined by the relative slopes of the two demand functions, controlling for the
supply of crude oil from the ROW.
4.2 Greenhouse Gas Emissions
Intended Emissions Savings
Our emissions results are presented in Tables 6 and 7. Each component of leakage from Equation (2.13) is
reported as a percentage of intended emissions savings.
The intended emissions savings of each scenario map directly from the change in ethanol consumption
induced by that scenario (Table 1). This follows from Equation (2.13) which illustrates that in our framework,
the intended emissions savings a policy is equal to the increase in ethanol consumption induced by the
policy multiplied by the lifecycle emissions savings of ethanol relative to gasoline (which are roughly 0.85
kgCO2e/liter). In 2009, the RFS is not binding relative to the VEETC baseline, so scenarios (4) and (5)
have no impact on emissions. Therefore, to compare across scenarios, we focus on 2012. Scenarios (2) and
(3), result in the largest intended emissions savings of roughly 20.5 tgCO2e. Scenario (1) results in intended
emissions savings of a similar, but smaller, magnitude, 16 tgCO2e. In contrast, scenarios (4) and (5), which
use the VEETC baseline as a counterfactual, only result in intended emissions savings of approximately 5.0
tgCO2e.
For scenarios (2) through (5), intended emissions savings increase between 2012 and 2015 because the
quantity of ethanol mandated by the RFS expands through 2015. The increase in intended emissions savings
31for scenarios (2) and (3) is small, but is nearly a doubling for scenarios (4) and (5). The intended emissions
savings in scenario (1) decrease slightly over this time as the impact of the VEETC on ethanol consumption
becomes smaller.
Land Market Leakage
Table 6 reports total land market leakage and decomposes total leakage in land markets into four sources
following equation (2.13). The rst three sources, corn production, other agriculture and domestic land use
change comprise the total leakage in domestic land markets (the \Domestic Land" term in equation (2.13)).
The fourth source of land market leakage is world land use change. Consistent with others (Searchinger et
al. [15] and US EPA [16]), we nd that biofuel policies are subject to considerable leakage in land markets,
ranging from 50% to 85% of intended emissions savings.
Total land market leakage is most severe in the scenarios that compare to the VEETC baseline. In 2012,
land market leakage in scenarios (4) and (5) oset approximately 71% of 5 tgCO2e of intended emissions
savings. In comparison, total land market leakage in 2012 for scenarios (2) and (3) was between 66% and
67% of roughly 20.5 tgCO2e. This pattern also holds for 2015. Land market leakage in scenarios (4) and (5)
increased to 85% of 9.6 tgCO2e intended emissions savings, while land market leakage in scenarios (2) and
(3) is 65% of a approximately 22 tgCO2e.
When comparing scenarios that use the same baseline, land market leakage is more severe in scenarios
that have large intended emissions savings, or equivalently larger impacts on ethanol consumption. For
example, in 2012 land market leakage in scenario (1), 63.4%, is smaller than total land market leakage in
scenarios (2) and (3), approximately 66%. In 2015, the relationship is simlar.
Following directly from the land use results, if the RFS is binding in a given year, then the VEETC
will have no impact on land market leakage. For example, scenarios (4) and (5) dier only by whether the
VEETC is imposed and result in the same magnitude total land market leakage in both 2012 and 2015.
Comparing scenario (2) to scenario (3) in each year further strengthens this point. In general, land market
leakage is insensitive to whether it is the RFS or VEETC driving the expansion in ethanol consumption.
World land use change generates the bulk of total land market leakage. In 2012, it accounts for a leakage
of around 70% for scenarios (1), (2) and (3). In the same year, world land use change in scenarios (4) and
(5) was over 80%. In scenarios (4) and (5) this leakage increases between 2012 and 2015 because the impact
of the RFS on ethanol consumption expands over this time. Domestic land use change, or the conversion
of CRP to crop land, is the other source of positive leakage. However, the leakage from domestic land use
change is considerably smaller than world land use change, ranging from 8% and 14% of intended emissions
savings. The dierence in leakage from these two sources is driven by the emissions factors; the emissions
32consequences of converting one unit of non-agricultural land to agricultural production are approximately 3
times greater in the rest of the world than in the US.
In all scenarios, both domestic corn and other domestic crop production are sources of negative leakage.
In 2012, leakage from domestic corn production ranges between -5.4% to -10% of intended emissions savings.
Leakage from corn production is negative because the additional land allocated to corn production per unit
ethanol used to calculate intended emissions savings overestimates the expansion in corn production relative





 in all scenarios and years.
A more substantial negative leakage indicates a larger overestimate.
This analysis of emissions from corn production illustrates a key weakness of lifecycle analysis, in par-
ticular when applied to large scale policies. The lifecycle calculation of the expansion in land allocated to
corn production relies only the yields of corn production and the per unit ethanol factor demand for corn
(see discussion in section 2.2). This calculation does not account for potential adjustments in agricultural
prices due to increased corn demand, or substitute end uses for corn, such as food production and exports.
Increased demand for corn due to expanded ethanol production will cause the price of corn to increase rela-
tive to other crops. In response, the consumers of agricultural products substitute away from corn to other
crops. The result is an increase in corn production that is less than the corn required to produce the ethanol
added by the policy. Our predicted increase in land allocated to corn production is smaller than the lifecycle
prediction, specically because our framework explicitly allows for this margin of adjustment.
Leakage from other domestic agricultural production is always negative because the amount of land
allocated to non-corn agricultural production falls in each scenario. Consistent across all scenarios and
years, leakage from other domestic agriculture is between -11% and -14% of intended emissions savings.
Interestingly, the negative leakage from other agriculture nearly osets the positive leakage from domestic
land use change, even though the per hectare emissions consequences of domestic land use change are greater
than the emissions savings from displacing non-corn agricultural production (see Table A.5). Leakage from
non-corn crop production and domestic land use are similar in absolute magnitude because the reductions
in non-corn cropland in each scenario are larger than the reductions in land allocated to CRP.
Fuel Market Leakage
Table 7 reports the two total emissions from fuel markets as a percentage of intended emissions savings.
Total leakage is further decomposed according to equation (2.13) in to leakage in the domestic fuel market
and the world crude oil market.
Leakage in the world crude oil market is positive in all scenarios, accounting for a leakage at least 55% of
intended savings. This follows that the world consumption of crude oil increases in each scenario (Table 5).
33In a given year, leakage in world crude markets is greater in scenarios that do not impose the VEETC. For
example, scenario (4) results in larger crude leakage than scenario (5) in both 2012, 74% relative 59.3%,
and 2015, 67.7% relative to 61%. Likewise, scenario (2) results in a marginally higher leakage in ROW
crude markets than scenario (3) in each year. Leakage in world crude oil markets is large because of the
size of world crude oil market in comparison with the domestic fuel market. Even small reductions in the
world price of crude oil generate emissions that are large relative to the intended emissions savings of biofuel
policies.
Leakage in the domestic fuel market is negative in scenario (4), but is positive in all other scenarios,
mirroring the changes in blended fuel consumption reported in Table 4. Domestic fuel market leakage is
largest in scenarios (1) and (3), both of which impose the VEETC. In 2009, scenario (1) is subject to leakage
of 68%, while scenario (3) generates leakage of 87%. In 2012 and 2015, domestic fuel market leakage in both
of these scenarios is greater than 79%. Domestic fuel market leakage in scenarios (2) and (5) is positive,
but notably smaller in percentage terms than scenarios (1) and (3). In scenarios (2) and (5) domestic fuel
market leakage is between 25% and 30% of intended emissions savings. In scenario (4), domestic fuel market
leakage is -170% in 2012 and -74.3% in 2015. This negative leakage occurs because imposing the RFS while
removing the VEETC results in decreased blended fuel consumption.
The domestic fuel market can be a large source of leakage, either positive or negative, because the per
liter emissions from gasoline is on the order of three times greater than the per liter intended emissions
savings of corn ethanol. Thus, when converted to emissions, small changes in blended fuel consumption are
magnied relative to increases in ethanol consumption.
Unlike total land market leakage, the magnitude of total fuel market leakage is largely determined by
the presence of the VEETC. In scenario (1), which isolates the impact of the VEETC, total fuel market
leakage dominates the intended emissions savings. Total fuel market leakage is 122% in 2009 and increases to
145.3% in 2015. When imposed jointly with the RFS, the VEETC serves only to increase total leakage in fuel
markets. Comparing scenario (3) to scenario (2) demonstrates that had the VEETC never been implemented,
total fuel market leakage due to the RFS would decrease from approximately 140% of intended emissions
savings to 90% of intended savings for each year reported. This is because imposing the VEETC increases
leakage in domestic fuel markets.
The dierence between scenarios (5) and (4) illustrates the impact of removing the pre-existing VEETC.
In 2012, total fuel market leakage due to the RFS is 86% of intended emissions savings if the pre-existing
VEETC is maintained. However, if the VEETC is removed, total fuel market leakage due to the RFS is
-96% of intended emissions savings. That is, fuel market adjustments generate emissions reductions that are
equal in magnitude to the intended emissions savings of the policy. The negative leakage in domestic fuel
34markets dominates the positive leakage in world crude markets. In 2015, removing the VEETC reduces total
fuel market leakage from 87% (scenario (5)), to -6.6% (scenario (4)).
Do Corn Ethanol Policies Reduce Emissions?
In each panel of Figure 1 we compare the intended emissions savings (solid black line with square markers) to
the emissions savings after accounting for leakage (dotted grey line) of a given scenario, for the years 2009 to
2015.46 Net emissions after accounting for land market leakage (dotted gray line with circular markers) and
fuel market leakage (dotted gray line with triangle markers) are also plotted. The horizontal axises measure
the increased ethanol consumption due to the policy in a given year. Thus, moving along the horizontal
axis illustrates an increase in the realized impact of the policy on ethanol consumption, and not necessarily
a progression through time.47 Positive leakage is illustrated by the leakage curve lying above the intended
emissions curve. A leakage curve above the horizontal axis indicates that leakage totally osets the intended
emissions savings and that the given scenario has a positive net impact on greenhouse gas emissions.
If both land and fuel market leakage is considered, carbon leakage easily outweighs intended emissions
savings in scenarios (1), (2), (3) and (5). The net increase in emissions is most severe in the scenarios that
impose the VEETC (1) and (3). For these scenarios, the actual change in emissions is roughly equal to
the negative of intended emissions savings. This relationship holds even as the increased consumption of
ethanol due to policy grows larger. For example, a 16 billion liter expansion in ethanol consumption driven
solely by the VEETC (scenario 1) results in a net increase in emissions of 13 tgCO2e, while the intended
emissions savings were 14 tgCO2e. A 19 billion liter increase in ethanol consumption results in emissions
of 15.8 tgCO2e while the intended emissions savings of that increase are 16 tgCO2e. Likewise, in scenario
(3) the intended emissions savings of a 22 billion liter expansion in ethanol consumption are 19 tgCO2e, but
after accounting for leakage, the net impact on emissions is an increase of 20 tgcCO2e. A 25 billion liter
increase in ethanol consumption results in intended emissions savings of 22 tgcCO2e but a net increase in
emissions of 23 tgCO2e.
In scenarios (1) and (3), the contribution of fuel market leakage to total leakage is greater than the
contribution of land market leakage. In fact, fuel market leakage alone dominates the intended emissions
savings; the fuel market leakage curve lies above the horizontal axis. If only land market leakage is considered,
then both scenarios would generate reductions in greenhouse gas emissions.
Scenarios (2) and (5) have a smaller positive impact on net emissions than scenarios (1) and (3). A
22 billion liter expansion in ethanol consumption in scenario (2) results in a net emissions increase of 10
46The line markers indicate a specic yearly observation.
47We do allow for dynamic trends in our simulations. As a result, the curves in Figure 1 do not completely isolate the eect
of the scale of the policy on leakage.
35tgCO2e, compared to intended emissions savings of 19 tgCO2e. In scenario (5), a 6 billion liter increase in
ethanol consumption causes an emissions increase of 2.8 tgCO2e, while the intended emissions savings of
this increase in ethanol consumption were 5 tgCO2e. In both of these scenarios, the contributions of fuel
market and land market leakage to total leakage is roughly equal. Further, neither land market leakage nor
fuel market leakage is alone large enough to completely oset the intended emissions savings, as both land
and fuel market leakage curves falls below the horizontal axis.
Scenario (4) does generate emissions savings, after accounting for leakage, because negative leakage in
fuel markets largely osets the positive leakage in land markets (the total leakage curve always falls below
the horizontal axis). However, fuel market leakage becomes less negative as the policy's impact on ethanol
consumption increases because the policy causes a smaller increase in the price of blended fuel. Thus, total
leakage is negative for smaller increases in ethanol consumption, but positive for larger increases.
For increases in ethanol consumption less than approximately 6 billion liters, total leakage is negative.
Thus, the emissions reductions generated by scenario (4), after accounting for leakage, are larger than the
intended emissions savings. For example, the net emissions reductions from a 4 billion liter increase in
ethanol consumption are 7.5 tgCO2e even though intended emissions reductions are only 3 tgCO2e. This
occurs because negative fuel market leakage is considerably larger in absolute value than the positive land
market leakage.
Increases in ethanol consumption greater than 6 billion liters result in positive total leakage, as positive
land market leakage starts to dominate the negative fuel market leakage. For an 8 billion liter increase in
ethanol consumption emissions reductions are 4 tgCO2e while intended emissions savings are 6.5 tgCO2e.
Fuel market leakage continues to fall (become less negative) with larger increases in ethanol consumption.
A 10 billion liter increase in ethanol consumption generates a 3 tgCO2e reduction in emissions, compared to
intended emissions savings of 8 tgCO2e.
5 Conclusion
This paper applies the insights of the carbon leakage literature to study the emissions consequences of
biofuel policies. We develop a simple analytic framework to decompose the intended emissions impacts of
biofuel policy from four sources of carbon leakage: domestic fuel markets, domestic land markets, world land
markets and world crude oil markets. A numerical simulation model illustrates the magnitude of each source
of leakage for two current US biofuel policies: the Volumetric Ethanol Excise Tax Credit and the Renewable
Fuel Standard.
Consistent with prior studies, we nd that US biofuel policies can lead to considerable carbon leakage
in both domestic and international land markets. In addition, we nd that by altering the relative prices of
36fossil fuels, biofuel polices also generate leakage in fuel markets. Critically, fuel market leakage is dependent
upon the biofuel policies being analyzed. For example, we nd that for policy scenarios that include the
VEETC, either alone or in conjunction with the RFS, fuel market leakage may actually exceed land market
leakage. When considering the RFS alone relative to no prior ethanol policies, fuel market leakage is less
than the other policy combinations considered, but is still positive. On the other hand, if the RFS were
to replace the pre-existing VEETC, we predict that the realized price of blended fuel would increase, and
hence lead to a decline in fuel market leakage. In this case, negative fuel market leakage can oset a sizable
portion of the positive leakage in land markets.
In the presence of both land and fuel market leakage, current US biofuel policies are unlikely to reduce
greenhouse gases. Four of the ve policy scenarios we consider lead to increases in greenhouse gas emissions.
That is, total leakage was greater than 100%. The single scenario that generates emissions savings, the
removal of the VEETC in conjunction with a binding RFS, only does so because negative leakage in the
domestic fuel market oset the remaining positive sources of leakage.
37A Appendix
A.1 Derivation of Marginal Emissions Formula




























































































and rearranging terms yields Equation (2.13). The equations in (A.3) allow for the decomposition of lifecycle
emissions and leakage. Equation (A.4) follows from equation (A.2).
A.2 Data and Calibration
Ethanol Production
To construct a national average ethanol producer, we consider four ethanol production technologies, which
are combinations of conversion technology (wet or dry milling) and fuel source (natural gas or coal). These
categories were used because wet milling and dry milling are inherently dierent technologies, produce
dierent co-products and have dierent corn and energy requirements. In 2003, dry mills red by natural
gas and coal account for 39.4% and 12.9% of total ethanol production respectively. Wet mills red by natural
gas account for 5.4% of total production and wet mills red by coal make up the remaining 42.3%. These
shares are derived from ethanol plant start up dates reported by the US EPA [16].
To calculate the net of co-product corn required to produce ethanol, we use the quantity of each co-
product produced per liter of ethanol reported in GREET 1.8c [12].
Labor inputs to ethanol production are calculated as total expenditures on energy, labor and capital
38for ethanol production. Following Farrell et al. [10], we assume that the energy requirements of ethanol
production are 13.2 MJ/liter, which represents a combination of natural gas, coal and electricity. Average
expenditures on labor and capital for ethanol production are assumed to be 0.0053 $/liter and 0.063 $/liter.
These values are consistent with values reported by an industry survey (Shapouri and Gallagher [58]).
Consistent with the US EPA [16], we assume a kilogram of distiller's dried grains displaces 0.95 kilograms
of corn and 0.05 kilograms of soybeans. A kilogram of corn gluten feed displaces 1.53 kilograms of corn and
a kilogram of corn gluten meal displaces 1.0 kilograms of corn. We allow corn oil to displace corn based on
its economic value in 2003, such that $1 of corn oil displaces $1 of corn.48
A.3 Emissions Factors
Ethanol Production
We consider only natural gas red ethanol production for our emissions analysis because the construction
of additional coal red ethanol production facilities is likely to be limited by the RFS legislation, because
ethanol produced by these facilities is unlikely to achieve the 20% lifecycle emissions reduction threshold
(US EPA [16]). While we do account for the make up of US ethanol production in the economic model,
for our emissions analysis we consider the \marginal" or additional production of ethanol, which we assume
occurs in natural gas red dry mills. Our ethanol production emissions factor is notably lower than an US
average emissions factor for ethanol production because coal red ethanol production is not considered in
our emissions analysis.
Agricultural Emissions
N2O emissions from agricultural production are calculated using methods and default parameters from the
IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories [59]. These methods map nitrogen additions to
agricultural soils, from synthetic fertilizers and crop residues, to N2O emissions.49 Crop specic synthetic
fertilizer application rates are from our agricultural dataset. Nitrogen additions from crop residues are
calculated using the crop yields from the economic model and crop-specic IPCC default parameters [59].
Emissions from agricultural energy use are calculated using the crop specic energy input requirements
from our agricultural data set and lifecycle emissions factors for the agricultural use of each energy type
estimated using GREET 1.8c [12]. These factors include both emissions from the combustion of the fossil
fuel plus the emissions from the production and transportation of the fuel.
Emissions from lime application to agricultural soils are estimated using IPCC default methods which
48We use this method because corn oil is utilized for much more than just an animal feed, and therefore the typical displacement
ratio methods used are not reected in the historic prices of the two products (Shapouri and Gallagher [58]).
49The IPCC methods also consider N inputs from synthetic and organic fertilizer, manure, sewer sludge and crop residues.
In the US, nitrogen inputs, and therefore N2O emissions, from organic fertilizer and sewer sludge are small and are therefore
not considered [2].
39assume that all carbon in lime applied to agricultural soils is converted CO2 [59].
We use GREET 1.8c [12] to estimate the lifecycle emissions of producing nitrogenous (N), phosphate (P),
and potassium (K) fertilizers, pesticide and agricultural lime. The farm input production lifecycle includes
feedstock recovery and transportation, and the production and transportation of the nal farm input.
The nitrogen production emissions factor is 2.99 kgCO2e per kilogram nutrient N. This factor is estimated
assuming a US average nitrogen fertilizer mix of 70.7% ammonia, 21.1% urea and 8.2% ammonium nitrate
(ERS [60]). This emissions factor include the emissions from producing the feedstock to fertilizer production
(primarily natural gas) as well as the emissions from the production and transportation of the fertilizer
itself. We use an emissions factor for the production of phosphate fertilizer of 1.04 kgCO2e per kg nutrient
P. This factor includes the production, processing and transportation of sulfuric acid, phosphoric rock and
phosphoric acid. Our emissions factor for the production of potassium fertilizer, which includes only the
emissions from production and transportation of potassium oxide (K2O), is 0.69 kgCO2e/kg nutrient K. The
lifecycle emissions of agricultural lime production are 0.63 kgCO2e/kg lime and present the net emissions
from mining, production and transportation, . We use an emissions factor for the production of pesticide, 21.9
kgCO2e/kg pesticide, that represents the weighted average emissions from the production of four herbicides
and a general insecticide.50
World Land Use Change
The international land use change emissions factors are derived from economic models used by the US
EPA that predict the location (54 regions) and type (pasture, native ecosystems) of land converted to
cropland as a result of the RFS for corn ethanol [16].51 The economic results are further disaggregated
spatially and into twelve land conversion categories, including forest, grassland, shrubland and savanna
among others. Land use conversion patterns are estimated using historical satellite land use cover data.
Due to variability in carbon stored by dierent ecosystem types, there is considerable heterogeneity in the
greenhouse gas emissions consequences of converting dierent native ecosystems to cropland. For example,
tropical forests, on average, have larger carbon stocks than temperate forests or grasslands, and as a result,
tropical deforestation releases relatively more greenhouse gases than the conversion of temperate forests or
grasslands. Unfortunately, these details fall outside of our modeling framework. It follows that our model
will be unable to capture how dierent policy instruments aect international land use conversion patterns.
However, we consider only corn ethanol policies and do not suspect that the patterns of land use conversion
50Crop specic shares of herbicide and insecticide to total pesticide are calculated from USDA data [41]. For each crop,
the share of herbicide is greater than 90%. We use the GREET 1.8c assumptions for the herbicide mix applied to corn and
soybeans, and assume herbicide applied to hay, wheat and cotton consists of equal parts of the four herbicides.
51The EPA analysis [16] also allows for cropland to expand onto pasture land. To the extent that the amount of land held as
pasture falls in response to biofuel policy (due to reduced livestock production), this pathway of adjustment serves to mitigate
the conversion of native ecosystems to agriculture, and therefore greenhouse gas emissions.
40will vary considerably across these policies.











D;i are the rest of world elasticities of supply and demand for crop i, and Di and Si are
the rest of world demand and supply for crop i. The elasticity values are taken from the FAPRI elasticity
database [61] and the supply and demand quantities are 2003 values reported by the USDA [54].
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46Tables
Table 1: Impact of Policies on Domestic Ethanol Consumption - Billion Liters
2009 2012 2015
No-Scenario Baseline 21.3 25.7 31.5
(1) VEETC 18.8 18.9 14.6
(2) RFS 18.6 24.5 25.4
(3) RFS + VEETC 18.8 24.3 25.3
VEETC Baseline 40.1 43.9 45.4
(4) RFS 0.0 5.7 11.3
(5) RFS+VEETC 0.0 6.1 11.4
47Table 2: Impacts of Policies on Land Use - Million Hectares
2009 2012 2015
Corn
No-Scenario Baseline 30.5 30.8 31.7
(1) VEETC 10.7% 10.4% 5.4%
(2) RFS 10.5% 13.6% 11.3%
(3) RFS + VEETC 10.9% 13.6% 11.3%
VEETC Baseline 33.7 33.9 33.3
(4) RFS 0.0% 2.9% 5.8%
(5) RFS+VEETC 0.0% 3.2% 5.8%
Other Crops (Soybeans, Hay, Wheat, Cotton)
No-Scenario Baseline 81.6 81.3 80.7
(1) VEETC -2.8% -2.8% -1.8%
(2) RFS -2.7% -3.7% -3.5%
(3) RFS + VEETC -2.9% -3.7% -3.5%
VEETC Baseline 79.3 79.1 79.3
(4) RFS 0.0% -1.0% -1.8%
(5) RFS+VEETC 0.0% -1.0% -1.8%
CRP
No-Scenario Baseline 13.6 13.6 12.9
(1) VEETC -7.0% -6.8% -1.9%
(2) RFS -7.1% -8.6% -6.0%
(3) RFS + VEETC -7.1% -8.6% -5.9%
VEETC Baseline 12.7 12.7 12.6
(4) RFS 0.0% -1.9% -4.2%
(5) RFS+VEETC 0.0% -2.1% -4.2%
World Non-Agricultural Land (million hectares)a
No-Scenario Baseline - - -
(1) VEETC -1.5 -1.4 -1.1
(2) RFS -1.4 -1.9 -2.3
(3) RFS + VEETC -1.6 -1.9 -2.3
VEETC Baseline - - -
(4) RFS 0.0 -0.5 -1.1
(5) RFS+VEETC 0.0 -0.5 -1.1
aBaselines are not calculated.
48Table 3: Impact of Policies on Domestic Fuel Prices
2009 2012 2015
Ethanol (including VEETC) - $/liter
No-Scenario Baseline 0.35 0.35 0.37
(1) VEETC -19.4% -18.9% -15.1%
(2) RFS 14.1% 22.9% 34.3%
(3) RFS + VEETC -19.1% -11.0% 1.7%
VEETC Baseline 0.28 0.28 0.31
(4) RFS 0.0% 51.4% 58.6%
(5) RFS+VEETC 0.0% 10.3% 20.4%
Gasoline - $/liter
No-Scenario Baseline 0.41 0.43 0.47
(1) VEETC -3.6% -2.8% -2.0%
(2) RFS -3.8% -5.1% -5.6%
(3) RFS + VEETC -3.6% -4.8% -5.4%
VEETC Baseline 0.40 0.42 0.46
(4) RFS 0.0% -2.2% -3.4%
(5) RFS+VEETC 0.0% -1.3% -2.5%
Blended Fuel (including fuel tax) - $/liter
No-Scenario Baseline 0.59 0.62 0.66
(1) VEETC -2.9% -2.4% -1.9%
(2) RFS -1.4% -1.4% -1.0%
(3) RFS + VEETC -2.9% -3.4% -3.1%
VEETC Baseline 0.58 0.60 0.64
(4) RFS 0.0% 1.2% 1.2%
(5) RFS+VEETC 0.0% -0.3% -0.4%
49Table 4: Impact of Policies on Fuel Quantities - Billion Liters
2009 2012 2015
Ethanol
No-Scenario Baseline 21.3 25.7 31.5
(1) VEETC 88.0% 73.7% 46.4%
(2) RFS 87.2% 95.4% 80.6%
(3) RFS + VEETC 88.0% 94.6% 80.1%
VEETC Baseline 40.1 43.9 45.4
(4) RFS 0.0% 13.1% 25.0%
(5) RFS+VEETC 0.0% 13.9% 25.1%
Gasoline
No-Scenario Baseline 445.6 449.1 446.6
(1) VEETC -1.8% -1.8% -1.3%
(2) RFS -2.4% -3.1% -3.3%
(3) RFS + VEETC -1.8% -2.3% -2.4%
VEETC Baseline 437.8 442.5 442.4
(4) RFS 0.0% -1.5% -2.2%
(5) RFS+VEETC 0.0% -0.8% -1.5%
Blended Fuel
No-Scenario Baseline 460.7 466.6 467.8
(1) VEETC 1.2% 1.0% 0.8%
(2) RFS 0.5% 0.6% 0.5%
(3) RFS + VEETC 1.2% 1.4% 1.3%
VEETC Baseline 466.1 472.4 472.8
(4) RFS 0.0% -0.5% -0.5%
(5) RFS+VEETC 0.0% 0.1% 0.2%
50Table 5: Impact of Policies on Crude Oil Markets - Billion Barrels
2009 2012 2015
Domestic Crude Oil
No-Scenario Baseline 2.1 2.1 2.1
(1) VEETC -1.7% -1.8% -1.3%
(2) RFS -2.4% -3.1% -3.2%
(3) RFS + VEETC -1.7% -2.2% -2.4%
VEETC Baseline 2.1 2.1 2.1
(4) RFS 0.0% -1.4% -2.2%
(5) RFS+VEETC 0.0% -0.8% -1.5%
World Crude Oil
No-Scenario Baseline 24.1 24.9 25.7
(1) VEETC 0.1% 0.1% 0.1%
(2) RFS 0.1% 0.1% 0.1%
(3) RFS + VEETC 0.1% 0.1% 0.1%
VEETC Baseline 24.1 24.9 25.7
(4) RFS 0.0% 0.0% 0.1%
(5) RFS+VEETC 0.0% 0.0% 0.1%
51Table 6: Land Market Leakage
2009 2012 2015
(1) No Policy ! VEETC
Intended Emissions Savings (tgCO2e) 15.5 16.0 12.6
Land Market Leakage 72.7% 63.4% 45.0%
Corn Production -6.2% -5.4% -22.5%
Other Agriculture -13.5% -12.8% -9.3%
Domestic LUC 14.1% 13.1% 4.5%
World LUC 78.3% 68.6% 72.3%
(2) No Policy ! RFS
Intended Emissions Savings (tgCO2e) 15.4 20.7 21.9
Land Market Leakage 69.3% 65.8% 64.5%
Corn Production -6.8% -5.6% -14.7%
Other Agriculture -13.0% -13.1% -11.3%
Domestic LUC 14.3% 12.9% 8.0%
World LUC 74.8% 71.5% 82.6%
(3) No Policy ! RFS and VEETC
Intended Emissions Savings (tgCO2e) 15.5 20.5 21.8
Land Market Leakage 76.8% 67.1% 65.5%
Corn Production -5.2% -5.2% -14.5%
Other Agriculture -13.9% -13.2% -11.4%
Domestic LUC 14.1% 12.9% 8.0%
World LUC 81.8% 72.5% 83.4%
(4) VEETC ! RFS
Intended Emissions Savings (tgCO2e) 0.0 4.7 9.6
Land Market Leakage 0.0% 72.0% 85.0%
Corn Production 0.0% -9.8% -6.8%
Other Agriculture 0.0% -13.9% -14.0%
Domestic LUC 0.0% 11.5% 12.6%
World LUC 0.0% 84.2% 93.3%
(5) VEETC ! RFS and VEETC
Intended Emissions Savings (tgCO2e) 0.0 5.0 9.6
Land Market Leakage 0.0% 70.9% 85.3%
Corn Production 0.0% -7.3% -6.7%
Other Agriculture 0.0% -14.4% -14.1%
Domestic LUC 0.0% 12.4% 12.6%
World LUC 0.0% 80.2% 93.6%
52Table 7: Fuel Market Leakage
2009 2012 2015
(1) No Policy ! VEETC
Intended Emissions Savings (tgCO2e) 15.5 16.0 12.6
Fuel Market Leakage 143.8% 135.4% 145.3%
Domestic Fuel 87.4% 79.4% 87.1%
World Crude 56.3% 56.0% 58.2%
(2) No Policy ! RFS
Intended Emissions Savings (tgCO2e) 15.4 20.7 21.9
Fuel Market Leakage 86.7% 89.3% 88.4%
Domestic Fuel 27.6% 29.1% 25.2%
World Crude 59.1% 60.2% 63.2%
(3) No Policy ! RFS and VEETC
Intended Emissions Savings (tgCO2e) 15.5 20.5 21.8
Fuel Market Leakage 143.5% 142.4% 139.6%
Domestic Fuel 87.1% 84.2% 78.8%
World Crude 56.4% 58.2% 60.8%
(4) VEETC ! RFS
Intended Emissions Savings (tgCO2e) 0.0 4.7 9.6
Fuel Market Leakage 0.0% -95.7% -6.6%
Domestic Fuel 0.0% -169.7% -74.3%
World Crude 0.0% 74.0% 67.7%
(5) VEETC ! RFS and VEETC
Intended Emissions Savings (tgCO2e) 0.0 5.0 9.6
Fuel Market Leakage 0.0% 85.7% 86.8%
Domestic Fuel 0.0% 26.4% 25.8%






































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1: Total Leakage
54Table A.1: Description of US Economy in Year of Calibration - 2003
Variable Value Source
Economy
Total Size of Economy (billion $) $7,667.60 [27]
Net Government Expenditures (billion $) $2,828.90 [27]
After Tax Value of Labor (billion $)) $3,474.59
After Tax Value of Capital (billion $) $1,336.49 [27]
Net Returns from Land Endowment (billion $) $27.61 [41], [24], [28] [37]
Land-Use Markets
Total Land Endowment (million hectares) 112.68 [24], [28]
Corn Acres (million hectares) 31.37 [24]
Soybean Acres (million hectares) 29.33 [24]
Wheat Acres (million hectares) 21.47 [24]
Hay Acres (million hectares) 25.65 [24]
Cotton Acres (million hectares) 4.68 [24]
CRP Acres (million hectares) 13.57 [28]
Price of Corn ($/metric ton) $95.23 [24]
Price of Soybeans ($/metric ton) $269.62 [24]
Price of Hay ($/metric ton) $94.22 [24]
Price of Wheat ($/metric ton) $118.65 [24]
Price of Cotton ($/metric ton) $1,036.32 [24]
Fuel Markets
VMT (trillion passenger miles) 2.69 [29]
Blended Fuel (billion liters) 499.97
Ethanol (billion liters) 10.39 [29]
Regular Gasoline (billion liters) 490.28 [29]
Crude Oil (billion barrels) 5.59 [62], [63], [64]
Price of VMT ($/passenger mile) $0.19
Price of Blended Fuel ($/liter) $0.41
Price of Ethanol ($/liter) $0.35
Price of Regular Gasoline ($/liter) $0.23 [26]
Price of Crude Oil ($/barrel) $28.85 [26]
Government Policies
Labor Tax Rate (%) 36.59%
Capital Tax Rate (%) 36.59%
Fuel Tax ($/liter) $0.10 [65]
Government Rental Payments to CRP ($/hectare) $114.48 [28]
Factor Prices
Price of Labor ($/hour) $9.05 [66]
Price of Capital ($/unit) $1.03 [67]
Price of Energy ($/ft3) $8.40 [26]
Price of Fertilizer ($/ton of NH3) $373.00 [42]
55Table A.2: Key Parameter Values
Parameter Value Source
Households
Elasticity of substitution, Household Utility, U1 0.5 See Text
Elasticity of substitution, Household Utility, U2a 0.09 See Text
VMT and Blended Fuel
Elasticity of substitution, VMT, U2b 0.21 See Text
Ratio of fuel cost to total cost of driving 0.4
Initial Fuel Economy (km/liter) 8.7 [29]
Ethanol
kilograms corn required per liter ethanol, E;Y1 2.56 [12]
Energy cost required per liter ethanol $0.06 [10]
Labor cost required per liter ethanol $0.0053 [58]
Capital cost required per liter ethanol $0.063 [58]
Regular Gasoline and Crude Oil
Elasticity of substitution, Regular Gasoline Production, P1 0.06
Elasticity of substitution, Regular Gasoline Production, P2 2
Share of per unit crude oil cost to total cost of gasoline 0.61 [62], [63], [64]
Own price elasticity of crude oil supply (central case) 0.50
Crude oil yield for regular gasoline 0.47 [62], [63], [64]
Processing gain per barrel of crude oil 0.05 [62], [63], [64]
Values are reported for year of benchmark, 2003. A subset of parameters are updated
annually.
Table A.3: Agricultural Expenditure Dataset
Total Expenditures ($/hectare)
Labor Capital Energy Fertilizer Total
Corn 73.32 142.06 57.06 386.97 659.41
Soybeans 44.50 108.33 21.67 209.92 384.43
Hay 49.08 130.13 27.06 153.26 359.52
Wheat 49.08 130.13 27.06 167.96 374.22
Cotton 124.39 157.14 60.27 749.58 1092.37
Components of Fertilizer Expenditure ($/hectare)
N P K Seed Chemicals Other
Corn 89.97 21.40 19.05 84.76 64.74 107.05
Soybeans 2.52 5.41 7.78 67.76 41.81 84.63
Hay 20.11 15.20 7.69 18.78 17.15 74.31
Wheat 43.89 11.27 2.59 18.78 17.15 74.31
Cotton 52.19 13.57 13.49 91.90 162.62 415.83
56Table A.4: Targeted Crop Area Elasticities
Corn Soybean Hay Wheat Cotton
Area Area Area Area Area
Corn Price 0.29y -0.23y -0.05yy -0.05y -0.07y
Soybean Price -0.15y 0.27y -0.01z -0.01y -0.08y
Hay Price -0.07yy -0.01y 0.20yy -0.08z -0.10z
Wheat Price -0.07y -0.01y -0.06z 0.34y -0.06y
Cotton Price -0.03y -0.02y -0.08z -0.01y 0.47y
Elasticity of CRP land with respect to the marginal net returns
to cropland is -0.07.
y: [68]; yy: Average of [69] and [70]; z: Best guess.















CRP 2.3 [14], [52]
Rest of World 8.0 [16]
1See appendix A.3 for description of calculations. N2O
emissions from agricultural production depend on crop
yields and therefore vary by year and policy. Values
for scenario (1) in 2015 are reported here.
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